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PRELIMINARY DRAFT – November 5, 2013 
Not for quotation or attribution without the authors’ consent 
 
 
WAITING FOR PERSEUS: A SUR-REPLY TO PROFESSORS GRAETZ AND WARREN 
 
Ruth Mason and Michael S. Knoll 
University of Virginia and University of Pennsylvania 
Introduction 
In an article published last year, entitled What is Tax Discrimination?, we offered two main 
arguments.1  First, we argued that tax discrimination, prohibited by European Union law, is not 
(as other scholars have argued) an incoherent concept, but can be best interpreted and understood 
as requiring what we call “competitive neutrality.”  Competitive neutrality, which is akin to the 
colloquial notion of ensuring a level playing field, prevents states from using their tax laws so as 
to put non-residents at a tax-induced competitive advantage relative to residents in the 
competition to secure jobs and make investments.  In our view, not only is the Court’s 
competitive neutrality interpretation of tax discrimination not incoherent, but it is a reasonable 
interpretation of the applicable law.  Second, we argued contrary to common perceptions about 
what tax nondiscrimination requires, if the Court interprets the EU tax nondiscrimination 
principle to prohibit violations of competitive neutrality, then the nondiscrimination principle 
does not require identical taxation of residents and non-residents by any member state.  This is 
important because national policymakers and commentators have criticized the Court for 
imposing what they see as an impossible standard of identical taxation of residents and 
nonresidents.  Instead, we showed that competitive neutrality requires only what we called 
“uniform” taxation.  Specifically, states must apply the same source taxes to residents and non-
residents working within their jurisdiction, and states must apply the same residence taxes to 
their residents’ domestic and foreign-sourced income.  The cumulative effect of source and 
                                                 
 Ruth Mason is Hunton and Williams Professor of Law, University of Virginia.  Michael Knoll is the Theodore 
K. Warner Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Professor of Real Estate, the Wharton School; 
Co-director, Center for Tax Law and Policy, University of Pennsylvania.  Copyright 2013 by Ruth Mason and 
Michael Knoll.  All rights reserved.  Not for quotation or attribution without the authors’ permission.  The authors 
would like to thank Al Dong for his assistance with research. 
1 Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, What Is Tax Discrimination? 121 Yale L.J. 1014 (2012). 
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residence taxes may result in residents and nonresidents paying tax at different rates, but, as we 
showed in our article, those differences will not violate competitive neutrality.  Competitive 
neutrality, thus, is not the same as tax harmonization or equal taxation because, when states tax 
on both a residence and source basis, residents of different states will face different total tax rates 
when they compete in a given market, but their competition will not be distorted by taxation.  
Accordingly, we argued that the ECJ should strike down non-uniform tax laws as discriminatory, 
and it should uphold uniform laws as non-discriminatory.  We argued that such guidance is 
straightforward and allows courts to promote a level playing field using commonsense rules of 
thumbs and without the need to engage in sophisticated economic analysis or examine reams of 
data. 
 
In their response, Michael Graetz and Alvin Warren, took issue directly with the two main 
theses of our article and much else we wrote there. 2  We are grateful for the deep engagement by 
Professors Graetz and Warren with our article.  A reader of those two articles might think there is 
nothing involving tax discrimination with which we and they agree.  That is not true.  Let us 
begin by highlighting twelve important areas where we agree with Graetz and Warren. 
 
First, we agree with Graetz and Warren that the ECJ tax discrimination cases are important.3  
They are important in part because of the amounts of money involved.4  Those cases are also 
important because they arise from two powerful forces that are in opposition to one another.5  On 
the one side are the long-established, closely guarded interests of each member state in 
designing, enforcing, and operating their own tax systems.  On the other side are the interests of 
the European Union and all of its member states in ensuring that individual member states do not 
take actions that compromise the single market.  As Graetz and Warren appropriately put it, 
“[t]here is considerable tension inherent in this structure.”6  Second, we agree that the EU treaties 
                                                 
2 Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination:  Still Stuck in the Labyrinth of 
Impossibility, 121 Yale L.J. 1118 (2012). 
3 See Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1121-22. 
4 Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Dividend Taxation in Europe:  When the ECJ Makes Tax Policy, 
Common Market L. Rev. 1577, _ (2007). 
5 See Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and Economic 
Integration of Europe, 115 Yale L.J. 1186, 1186 (2006) (“an irresistible force is now confronting an immovable 
object”).  See also Suzanne Kingston, The Boundaries of Sovereignty:  The ECJ’s Controversial Role Applying 
Internal Market Law to Direct Tax Measures, 9 Cambridge Y.B. Eur. Legal Stud. 287 (2006-07) 
6 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1121. 
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were intended, among other goals, to create a single market that was relatively free of internal 
barriers and where member states would not be able to favor their own residents over out-of-state 
residents or to favor domestic over interstate economic activity and trade.7  As Graetz and 
Warren write, ‘[m]ore recent analyses suggest a growing awareness that the rights and 
obligations [contained in the EU treaties] constitute a general prohibition of discrimination 
against commerce among the member states.’  In the language of a recent advocate general’s 
opinion, national laws ‘must not result in less favourable treatment being accorded to 
transnational situations than to purely national situations.’”8  Quoting the same opinion by 
Advocate General Miguel Maduro, Graetz and Warren write that “the different criteria 
established by the ECJ for the application of the Treaty freedoms, such as market access and 
nondiscrimination based on nationality, ‘all spring from the same source of inspiration which [is] 
. . .  to prevent Member States from creating or maintaining in force measures promoting internal 
trade to the detriment of intra-community trade.’”9 
 
Third, we agree that the EU treaties promote the single market through both negative and 
positive integration.10  Negative integration refers to limitations enforced by courts on member 
state actions that interfere with the operation of the single market.  In contrast, positive 
integration, which is brought about through legislative action, is the enactment of rules, laws, or 
directives that apply uniformly throughout the single market.  Commentators often refer to 
positive integration as harmonization.  The European Commission, Council, and Parliament 
together can issue income tax directives that apply uniformly throughout the European Union, 
but such tax directives are rare because they require unanimous agreement by the member 
states.11  Positive integration is more common in the European Union in areas outside of taxation 
where unanimity is not required.  Fourth, we agree that the norm against tax discrimination is not 
a stand-alone, explicitly articulated concept, but is instead derived from the fundamental 
freedoms of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU):12  the free movement 
                                                 
7 Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1120-21. 
8 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1199 (footnotes omitted). 
9 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1199 (citing C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. Haley, ¶ 37 (Apr. 7, 
2005) (opinion of advocate general Maduro). 
10 See Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1120. 
11 See Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1120. 
12 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Mar. 30, 2010 [hereinafter 
TFEU]. 
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of goods, capital, workers, services and the right of business establishment.13  Thus, the 
fundamental freedoms, expressed as individual rights, also operate as limitations on the policies 
of the member states,14 and so constitute a form of negative integration. 
 
Fifth, we also agree with Graetz and Warren that the prohibition against tax discrimination is 
the principal legal construct that the ECJ has used to strike down tax laws that interfere with the 
single market.15  However, we recognize, as do Graetz and Warren, that the ECJ also has used 
other constructs—for example, the notion of “restrictions”–—to strike down laws that interfere 
with the single market, including some tax laws.16  Sixth, we agree that any interpretation of 
discrimination in the tax context should be capable of being extended more broadly to non-tax 
cases covered by the fundamental freedoms, or at least it should be capable of co-existing with a 
reasonable interpretation of those non-tax cases.17  Seventh, we agree that the capital and labor 
tax discrimination cases should be treated similarly.18  That is to say, we agree that any theory of 
tax discrimination should apply to both labor and capital, and it should not apply to only one 
sphere but not the other.19 
 
Eighth, we agree that the ECJ tax discrimination cases are confusing and that the ECJ has not 
clearly and consistently articulated its guiding principle for deciding them.  There are numerous 
reasons for this failure.  Professors Rita de la Feria and Clemens Fuest emphasize the 
“archetypal” confusion between method and objective.20  In their view, the ECJ treats preventing 
                                                 
13 Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1194 (describing nondiscrimination as “a concept developed 
principally through the ECJ’s interpretation of the four freedoms”). 
14 See Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1120 (describing the ECJ’s charge to ensure that tax laws do 
not interfere “unduly” with the fundamental freedoms). 
15 Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1121. 
16 A full discussion of how our approach would apply to restrictions is also beyond the scope of this sur-reply.  
17 Graetz & Warren (2006), 121 Yale L. J. at 1152. 
18 As we explained in our earlier Article, the reason we focused on the labor cases was to reach a broader 
audience that would not likely be as interested in or might find it difficult to follow the technical tax issues raised in 
the ECJ’s corporate tax cases.   Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1038 (“although our arguments have 
implications for capital taxation, we do not consider those implications here”). 
19 That is to say, we accept what Graetz and Warren describe as the strong form of our claim.  Graetz & Warren 
(2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1128-29.  Although we accept the strong form of the claim, we recognize that a thorough 
discussion of how our approach would apply to capital, especially to investments made through corporations, is 
beyond the scope of this sur-reply.  The extension of our approach to capital is a matter we intend to take up in the 
future.  
20 Rita de la Feria & Clemens Fuest, Closer to an Internal Market? The Economic Effects of EU Tax 
Jurisprudence, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation working paper 18 (July 2011).  
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tax discrimination as an end in itself rather than as a means to an end, promoting free movement.  
In our article, we mentioned the practice of issuing court opinions, rather than individual judges’ 
opinions, which tends to strip out the reasoning upon which the holding is based.  Whatever the 
reason, we agree with Graetz and Warren that the opinions of the ECJ are often written in an 
opaque and bureaucratic manner that can obscure the rationale for their holdings.21  Such a lack 
of clarity has attracted the condemnation of commentators.  As we wrote in our article, 
commentators have described the ECJ’s tax discrimination jurisprudence as “baffling,” 
“theoretical and arcane,” and “incoherent.”22  Our article begins with those criticisms and seeks 
to provide an avenue to allay them by identifying the efficiency principle, if any, behind the 
ECJ’s interpretation of tax discrimination, by explaining that principle in economic terms, and by 
describing how to consistently apply that principle. 
 
Ninth, we agree with the conclusion of Graetz and Warren, which they set forth most 
extensively in their 2006 Yale Law Journal article, that the ECJ’s tax jurisprudence cannot be 
readily reconciled with either capital import neutrality (CIN) or capital export neutrality (CEN). 
Tenth, we agree that there is no single principle that any of the four of us has articulated that will 
explain either the reasoning or the result of 100 percent of the ECJ tax discrimination cases.  
Eleventh, we agree with Graetz and Warren that the ECJ has been more aggressive in striking 
down member state laws that advantage residents over foreigners than in striking down laws that 
advantage foreigners over residents.23  That is to say, the ECJ has rarely found instances of 
“reverse discrimination” to violate the prohibition on tax discrimination.24  Twelfth, we agree 
with Graetz and Warren that there are similarities between the tax discrimination jurisprudence 
and constitutional structure of both the European Union and the United States.25  In our writings, 
we and they have compared and contrasted the treatment of particular tax issues under the tax 
nondiscrimination principles operating in each jurisdiction.26  Nonetheless, because Graetz and 
                                                 
21 Graetz & Warren (2007),  44 Com. Mkt. L. Rev. at 1602-11 (criticizing ECJ opinions for not explaining its 
decisions). 
22 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1017 (quoting commentators). 
23 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1156-58. 
24 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1156. 
25 Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1236-1244 (comparing U.S. and EU tax discrimination cases, but 
emphasizing the differences between U.S. and EU legal structures that make drawing inferences from one context to 
the other risky).    
26 Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1236-1244; Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L. J. at 1106-1115. 
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Warren confine themselves largely to the European Union in their response, we will try to do the 
same here.  These are significant areas of agreement, but perhaps more interesting are the places 
where we disagree. 
 
Much of the disagreement between us and Graetz and Warren appears to stem from a 
difference in perspective.  Graetz and Warren primarily take a national tax policy perspective. 
They conclude that the ECJ’s decisions “did not (and could not) satisfy commonly accepted tax 
policy norms, such as fairness, administrability, economic efficiency, production of desired level 
of revenues, avoidance of double taxation, fiscal policy responses to economic circumstances, 
inter-nation equity and so on.”27  They criticize the ECJ’s tax nondiscrimination jurisprudence 
because it compromises each member state’s ability to enact good tax policy, that is, Graetz and 
Warren examine the ECJ tax discrimination decisions from the perspective of how those 
decisions encroach on member states’ tax sovereignty.  But nowhere do they offer a clear 
interpretation of the fundamental freedoms or a precise statement of the meaning of tax 
discrimination.  Nor do they offer a clear indication how the ECJ should enforce the fundamental 
freedoms.28 
 
We, in contrast, take as our starting point the notion that the tax nondiscrimination principle 
prevents states from enacting tax laws that interfere with the operation of the single market—
including cases where notions of national tax policy might counsel otherwise.29  By examining 
the language and structure of the foundational treaties, contemporaneous sources that explain the 
goals and benefits of the treaties, and the ECJ tax discrimination cases, we then attempt to 
describe in more detail what aspects of the single market the tax nondiscrimination principle is 
intended to advance.30  Based on our reading of those sources, we conclude that the value 
promoted by the fundamental freedoms is what we call “competitive neutrality”—the idea that 
states should not use their tax and regulatory systems to discourage competition from out-of-state 
interests.  We translate that value into the language of modern public finance. 
                                                 
27 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1118. 
28 Graetz and Warren do provide the ECJ with a menu of options, which we consider later.  See infra notes ___–
___ and accompanying text. 
29 For example, there could be circumstances under which a particular state would gain from enacting a 
protectionist tax, and a tax policy perspective that advocates maximizing national welfare therefore would counsel in 
favor of the tax.  Nevertheless, the tax nondiscrimination principle, as we understand it, would forbid such a tax. 
30 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1026-1033, 1085-1097. 
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Specifically, we argue that the fundamental freedoms, as they have been interpreted by the 
ECJ through its application of the tax nondiscrimination principle, should be understood as 
promoting what public finance economists call capital ownership neutrality (CON) in cases 
involving capital movement and business establishment and as the labor analog of CON in cases 
involving the movement of workers and provision of services.  Together, we refer to these 
underlying values as competitive neutrality, or sometimes as a “level playing field.”  We argue 
that if the ECJ agrees, as its cases seem to indicate, that the tax nondiscrimination principle 
promotes competitiveness, then the Court should say so explicitly. 
 
That the tax nondiscrimination principle would pursue a level playing field between 
economic actors from different EU member states is an intuitively attractive idea, but achieving a 
level tax playing field often requires thinking in non-intuitive ways.  For example, as we explain 
in our article, whether competition between two actors is tax-neutral cannot be determined from 
a simple comparison of their absolute tax rates.  Because the formal requirements of competitive 
neutrality are not obvious, we describe at length what a competitive neutrality interpretation of 
tax nondiscrimination means for how states and courts should apply the tax nondiscrimination 
principle to real cases.31  We argue (under standard, idealized economic assumptions) that 
competitive neutrality requires what we describe as “uniform” source and residence taxation and 
universal adoption of one of two methods of cross-border taxation.  We also show that some 
long-standing and widely accepted tax policies interfere with the single market.  We go on to 
consider various institutional constraints and limitations the ECJ faces that prevent it from fully 
achieving the competitiveness goals underlying the fundamental freedoms.  In light of those 
constraints, we offer specific recommendations for how the ECJ can balance the goals of the 
single market with the Court’s own limited powers and with other competing values.32 
 
                                                 
31 In further work, we intend to look more deeply into what is required in order to achieve CON.  As part of that 
exercise, we intend to expand our analysis to cover related questions, such as, how should a determination be made 
whether residents and nonresidents are sufficiently similar for the purpose of making the relevant comparison for a 
discrimination determination. 
32 Additionally, and for good measure, in case the ECJ does not agree with our reading of its tax discrimination 
decisions, we offer formal analysis of how the ECJ should decide tax cases if the nondiscrimination principle instead 
requires locational neutrality or savings/leisure neutrality.  Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1043-51, 72-74. 
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I. Interpreting the Tax Nondiscrimination Principle to Require Competitive Neutrality 
While we cannot hope to answer all the objections Graetz and Warren raise in their fifty page 
response to our article, we will try here to respond to what we view as their most serious 
criticisms.  Those criticisms can be divided into two broad categories that track the two parts of 
our original article.  First, Graetz and Warren take issue with our interpretation of tax 
nondiscrimination as concerned with competitiveness.  Second, Graetz and Warren raise 
questions about how our proposal would apply in both theory and practice.  We take these two 
groups of criticisms in turn. 
 
A. Methodological Criticism: The Role of Welfare Economics 
In our article, we argued that the ECJ has been enforcing the TFEU’s prohibition on tax 
discrimination in a manner that promotes competiveness.  Graetz and Warren, however, claim to 
be “mystified” by our theory of constitutional interpretation.33  According to them, we first 
choose economic efficiency as the paramount norm for evaluating tax discrimination.  We then 
choose one efficiency concept, competitive neutrality, over other alternative efficiency concepts 
without theoretical or empirical support.  And then, after subsequently conceding that the ECJ 
lacks institutional authority to fully implement competitive neutrality on its own (because it 
needs assistance from the legislature), we then urge the ECJ to raise competitive neutrality to 
“constitutional status.”34 
 
In our view, the above description seriously misconstrues both the structure and the 
substance of our argument.35  It essentially reverses our argument. We begin with the language 
and structure of the treaties.36  The treaties establish the goal of the creation of an internal 
market, “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties.”37  The EU 
treaties advance the vision of an internal market in at least two ways.  First, they provide a 
legislative process whereby member states can harmonize their laws (although this process is 
                                                 
33 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1153. 
34 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1153. 
35 Graetz and Warren offer a summary of what they believe our argument to be in eight propositions.  Graetz & 
Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1127-28.  In our view, that summary seriously misstates our arguments. 
36  Part III of our original article makes the case for a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination. 
37 TFEU, Art. 26, para. 2. 
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stricter in tax than in some other areas).  Second, they expressly restrain the actions of the 
member states, including through the fundamental freedoms.  In the direct tax area, the 
fundamental freedoms are enforced principally, although not exclusively, as a prohibition on 
what the ECJ has labeled “discrimination.” 
 
Because the internal market and the fundamental freedoms are legal concepts with economic 
content,38 we analyze them in efficiency terms.  We did not choose an efficiency perspective at 
random. As we explain in our article, our focus on efficiency follows the approach of the ECJ, 
which couches its tax discrimination decisions exclusively in efficiency terms, rather than in 
terms of other values, such as promoting political unity or solidarity.39  Having used the structure 
and language of the EU treaties and the ECJ’s own tax discrimination jurisprudence to identify 
efficiency as the most important value promoted by the prohibition of tax discrimination, to 
determine what particular kind of efficiency the nondiscrimination principle pursues, we turned 
to capital neutrality benchmarks that have served as the basis for efficiency analysis of 
international tax since the 1960s, namely locational neutrality (also called capital export 
neutrality or CEN)40 and saving/leisure neutrality (also called capital import neutrality or CIN).41  
So would many commentators.  For example, Graetz and Warren considered these two capital 
neutrality benchmarks as possible candidates for interpreting nondiscrimination in their 2006 
article.42  We also considered CON or competitive neutrality, another leading capital neutrality 
benchmark, and one that Graetz and Warren did not consider in their 2006 article.  Based on our 
reading of the TFEU and the tax discrimination cases, we then concluded that the tax 
nondiscrimination principle “accords better”43 with competitive neutrality than it does with the 
                                                 
38 Frans Vanistendael, General Report on the Fundamental Freedoms and National Sovereignty in the European 
Union, chapter V in EU Freedoms and Taxation (F. Vanistendael, ed. 2006), at 171. 
39 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1034-6. 
40 The term we use to cover CEN and its labor analog. 
41 Savings/leisure neutrality is the term we use to cover CIN and its labor analog.  In contrast, competition 
between in-state and out-of-state commercial interests falls under competitive neutrality. 
42 See Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1195-98 (describing how states can use their income tax laws 
to discriminate against foreign products, producers and production and relating discrimination against foreign 
producers to CON and discrimination against foreign production to CEN). 
43 See, e.g., Mason & Knoll (2012), 212 Yale L.J. at 1022. See also id. at 1042 (“competitive neutrality turns out 
to be a better fit than locational neutrality or leisure neutrality for the nondiscrimination principle, given the text of 
the TFEU, the goals of the EU, and the ECJ’s tax nondiscrimination doctrine”) (emphasis added); id. at 1097 (“we 
argue that the ECJ’s interpretation of the principle of tax nondiscrimination hews more closely to competitive 
neutrality than to locational neutrality (and that it does not coincide at all with leisure neutrality).”) (emphasis 
added). 
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other two traditional capital neutrality benchmarks, namely locational neutrality and 
saving/leisure neutrality.  Thus, we did not chose competitive neutrality because we concluded, 
without the benefit of theoretical or empirical support, that competitive neutrality would better 
promote overall economic welfare.44  Rather, we chose competitive neutrality because it is a 
superior interpretation of the language of the treaties than the other two norms and because it 
accords better with the ECJ’s actual decisions in tax cases than do the other two benchmarks.  
Thus, whereas Graetz and Warren characterize competitive neutrality as our “assumed 
constitutional norm,”45 we would characterize it as an “observed constitutional norm.” 
 
Graetz and Warren’s reversal of the structure of our argument plays out again and again 
throughout their reply.  They repeatedly criticize us for failing to justify on normative grounds 
our claim that the doctrine of tax nondiscrimination should be interpreted and applied so as to 
advance competitiveness.46  For example, Graetz and Warren fault us for not showing that the 
interpretation of tax nondiscrimination that we endorse—competitive neutrality—would “reduce 
tax-induced distortions more than competing efficiency norms.”47  They correctly argue that “a 
policy decision based on an economic efficiency standard should be grounded on evidence as to 
the magnitude of the various distortions.”48  We agree, and we acknowledge this in our article.49  
Again, because our goal was to determine whether any of the efficiency norms fit the extant tax 
discrimination jurisprudence, we did not see it as our goal to show that the norm that was the 
best fit was also the best possible norm.50 
 
                                                 
44 Graetz & Warren repeatedly describe us as “choosing” competitive neutrality.  But our argument is that the 
language of the TFEU and the tax decisions of the ECJ reflect a choice to interpret tax nondiscrimination to promote 
competitive neutrality.  Thus, any choice that was made in favor of competitive neutrality was not made by us, but 
rather by the founders of the EU and the members of the ECJ. 
45 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1153. 
46 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1141, 1153. 
47 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1118. 
48 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1139. 
49 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1098.  See also id. at 1086 where we state in the text that “we do not 
advocate competitive neutrality from first principles,” by which we explain in note 195 that “we do not argue that a 
competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination would do a better job of promoting economic welfare or 
any specific notion of the good, justice, or fairness than other possible interpretations”). 
50 As we said in our original article, our claim that the tax discrimination principle is intended to promote 
competitive neutrality is not an argument that the European Union does not care about locational neutrality or that 
the EU treaties do not promote locational neutrality in other ways.  The provisions in the foundational treaties that 
set out procedures for achieving positive harmonization are a clear example of the value the European Union places 
on locational neutrality.    
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Graetz and Warren’s critique of our article amounts to a lament that we did not take up the 
question, “What ought to be the interpretation of tax discrimination from an economic welfare 
perspective?”  But our goal was to answer a more limited set of questions, namely, “what is the 
extant legal definition of tax discrimination, and what are the economic implications of that 
definition?”51  Thus, we are trying to describe in a more rigorous, economics-oriented fashion the 
interpretation that we believe best captures the existing language of the treaties and its 
interpretation by the ECJ.  Ideally, the answers to Graetz and Warren’s question and the answers 
to our questions would be related.  But it’s not obvious that they are identical.  Their criticism, 
thus, confuses our interpretive project with their policy project. 
 
Although we view the welfare consequences of alternative ways of structuring 
nondiscrimination law as secondary to our descriptive project, Graetz and Warren see it as 
central to their normative project.  For example, Graetz and Warren express surprise that we do 
not focus on rate differentials among the member states.52  Rate differentials (Ireland taxes 
everyone, resident or nonresident, at 15% while Germany taxes everyone at 40%) may burden 
(or restrict) cross-border commerce.  In that sense, of course rate differentials impact work and 
investment within the European Union.  But the ECJ has clearly held that the nondiscrimination 
principle does not restrain variation in national tax rates, as long as each member state applies its 
rates even-handedly to all comers.53  Thus, even if Graetz and Warren are correct when they 
assert that rate differentials may be the most distortive features of member state tax systems,54 
uniformly applicable rate differentials nonetheless are not relevant to the legal question 
addressed by our article.55  Again, Graetz and Warren want to take on a big issue, namely, how 
                                                 
51 In the same vein, we do not ask whether it might be possible to draft or construct a different and more 
efficient framework for the single market with a different division of rights and responsibilities among the member 
states than that which is already contained in the EU treaties.   
52 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1148. 
53 See, e.g., Gilly paras. 46-53. 
54 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1149. 
55 Compare Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, 1998 E.C.R. I-2793, ¶¶ 34, 48 
(holding that a cross-border tax disadvantage caused by the resident state’s foreign tax credit limitation did not 
violate EU law because the disadvantage was caused by neutrally-applied, but divergent, “scales of direct taxation” 
and to require the resident state to “reduce its tax in respect of the remaining income . . . would . . . encroach on its 
sovereignty in matters of direct taxation”)with Royal Bank of Scot., 1997 E.C.R. I-2651, ¶ 34 (holding that Greece 
discriminated when it taxed domestic banks at 35%, but branches of foreign banks at 40%). 
Although rate differentials are an important source of locational distortions, they are left out of a variety of 
multistate agreements designed to promote cross-border commerce.  For example, the GATT and GATS allow 
national VAT rates to vary, but they forbid certain import duties and export subsidies.  The requirements under those 
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do we reduce economic distortions in Europe?  Rate differentials would clearly be important for 
this question.  But we have a narrower goal.  We are asking only “what is tax discrimination?” 
 
Our approach, which was to argue that a competitive neutrality interpretation of the tax 
nondiscrimination principle seems to best fit the text and doctrine, may, as Graetz and Warren 
claim, put us in a “second- or third-best world.”  We do not disagree, and we acknowledge so in 
our article.56  We, however, fail to see the connection between this observation and our 
argument.57  Moreover, although Graetz and Warren say that they disagree with our 
interpretation, they do not dispute our conclusion that competitive neutrality is the best fit for the 
text and doctrine by offering an alternative interpretation that they claim better fits the text and 
doctrine.58  There may be some not-yet-identified norm that corresponds better with the language 
and the structure of the treaties and the doctrine than does competitive neutrality.  But we have 
not been able to identify it, and Graetz and Warren suggest no alternative. 
 
Despite not claiming (and not regarding it as essential for our doctrinal argument to claim) 
that competitive neutrality is the best possible interpretation of tax nondiscrimination, we do 
claim in our article that interpreting the tax nondiscrimination principle to require competitive 
neutrality is welfare-enhancing as compared to a situation in which the ECJ did not police tax 
                                                                                                                                                             
treaties are for “national treatment” and “most favored nation treatment,” which can also be characterized as 
nondiscrimination obligations.  Thus, allowing each state to choose its tax rate is not necessarily incompatible with 
the idea of prohibiting protectionism (and other forms of discrimination).  
56 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1099, n. 235. 
57 As Ian Roxan put it, the Treaty “provisions on freedom of  movement are concerned to ensure that freedom of 
movement is unrestricted.  They do not themselves require that the resulting movement be economically efficient.”  
Ian Roxan, 63 Mod. L. Rev. 831, 845 (2000). 
58 Graetz and Warren object that there are examples of cases that do not seem to pursue competitive neutrality.  
We do not disagree.  As we note in our article, if the application of tax nondiscrimination rules reflect “competitive 
neutrality goals, they do not reflect rigorous application of our formal conception of competitive neutrality.” Mason 
& Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1116 (emphasis added).  We speculate that this lack of rigor may be attributable to 
the complexities and subtleties of competitive neutrality, and so we attempt to provide simple rules of thumb that 
would assist courts in applying the concept in the future. 
Graetz and Warren also argue that if the tax nondiscrimination principle required competitive neutrality, then 
the ECJ should also strike down cases of so-called “reverse discrimination,” that is, cases in which the member state 
treats outsiders better than insiders.  We agree that a strict competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination 
would compel this conclusion.  While reverse discrimination is an important piece of the puzzle, we did not have 
space in our article (or in this response) to address it.  We note here, however, that the ECJ handles cases of reverse 
discrimination under the more specific language in Article 107 TFEU which prohibits reverse discrimination under 
the rubric “state aids.” See Article 107 TFEU, providing, in relevant part, “Save as otherwise provided in the 
Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far 
as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.” 
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discrimination at all.  That is because tax-induced distortions of competition—especially 
protectionists taxes—reduce welfare, so eliminating them should enhance welfare.  As we state 
in the article, 
There is no consensus among economists . . .  that competitive neutrality is more important 
than locational neutrality from a welfare perspective. . . . However, economists generally 
agree that violations of competitive neutrality reduce welfare.  Economists also widely 
recognize that states, unless they are constrained, will enact trade barriers that tilt the playing 
field in favor of domestic interests with attendant negative welfare consequences.  In other 
words, absent legal or other restraints, states will tend to violate competitive neutrality, which 
will reduce welfare.”59 
 
Graetz and Warren would appear to agree.  As they wrote in their 2006 article: 
“[Limiting] the ability of the ECJ to strike down member states’ income tax provisions… 
would permit considerable mischief by the member states.  As our review of the ECJ 
cases has shown, some member state tax provisions are potentially quite protectionist, 
and some have been adopted to serve precisely that purpose.  The dilemma for the nations 
of Europe is to find a way to retain their autonomy over tax matters without undermining 
the internal market and, as a practical matter, severely restricting the four freedoms.”60 
 
Moreover, we believe that identifying competitive neutrality as the principle underlying the 
ECJ’s tax discrimination decisions and putting that principle into economic terms provides 
guidance for courts seeking to enforce the fundamental freedoms by framing the central issue in 
tax discrimination cases.  If, as we argued in the article, the judges of the ECJ are trying to apply 
a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination by intuition, then express 
identification of that value should enable the Court to (1) clarify whether competitive neutrality 
is indeed its guiding principle and (2) reach more consistent results.  If the ECJ agrees that the 
nondiscrimination principle pursues competitive neutrality, then in resolving tax discrimination 
cases it need not limit itself to drawing analogies from precedent.  Rather it can attempt to 
directly ascertain whether or not the challenged tax policy interferes with competitive neutrality.  
                                                 
59 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1098. 
60 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1233. 
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In addition, identifying the principle behind tax discrimination and putting that principle into 
economic terms also allows commentators and other court observers to evaluate whether the ECJ 
or a national court has correctly applied the norm in particular tax discrimination cases. 
 
B. Substantive Criticism 
Graetz and Warren’s principal criticism is that we have not provided sufficient normative 
grounding for that claim that the prohibition of tax discrimination in the TFEU is best interpreted 
as promoting competitive neutrality.  For the reasons described above, their welfare-economics-
based criticism is not germane to our interpretive argument.  In their reply, Graetz and Warren 
also raise several narrower, substantive challenges to our interpretation.  Specifically, Graetz and 
Warren argue that:  (1) our interpretation of tax discrimination is too narrow from a normative 
perspective;61 (2) the capital neutrality benchmarks that are the bases for the labor neutrality 
benchmarks that we discuss in the article (especially CON) do not translate from capital to 
labor;62 (3) our focus on cross-border workers is misplaced63 and our argument in favor of a 
competitive neutrality interpretation of the law is based on an unrealistic assumption—that 
residence is fixed;64 (4) we ignore the law on impermissible “restrictions” that is inconsistent 
with our interpretation;65 and (5) a competitive neutrality interpretation of tax discrimination is 
not supported by the outcomes of the cases, the language of the cases, or the EU treaties from 
which the principle of tax nondiscrimination is derived.66  We respond to each of these 
arguments in turn. 
 
1. “Narrow” Focus on Efficiency 
Graetz and Warren fault our conclusion that efficiency is “the most important norm for 
deciding tax discrimination cases” because, in their view, “this is much too restrictive a focus for 
constitutional courts.”67  Yet, many constitutions contain provisions that promote efficiency, and 
                                                 
61 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1129-30. 
62 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1130-35. 
63 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1134-35. 
64 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1135-39. 
65 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1124-27. 
66 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1155-61. 
67 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1129. 
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the EU treaties are no exception.68  For example, the EU treaties prohibit the member states from 
imposing customs duties and quantitative restrictions on imports and exports.69  Free trade in 
goods, a concept endorsed by the EU treaties, is surely an efficiency concept.  In addition, the 
history of the European Union reflects a strong desire to improve economic efficiency,70 
although that is not the only motivation for the Union’s creation, maintenance, and growth. 
 
But most importantly, economic efficiency is the only factor the ECJ cites in making its tax 
discrimination determinations.  As we noted in our article, “[b]ecause our goal . . . is to try to get 
a clearer understanding of what the tax nondiscrimination principle requires, it seems prudent to 
discuss what the ECJ itself has identified as tax nondiscrimination’s most important underlying 
value.”71  Although it might reflect a lack of imagination, we are at a loss for how to formalize 
the ECJ’s conception of tax discrimination without considering the only value that the ECJ has 
identified as relevant to the project.72  Nor do Graetz and Warren cite any cases that support the 
notion that economic efficiency is not the lodestar for tax discrimination cases.  Although they 
note that the ECJ “recently [has] given more weight to member state defenses grounded in fiscal 
and administrative concerns,”73 that observation is misplaced.  As we note in our article, the 
procedure followed by the ECJ is to first determine whether a member state has engaged in tax 
discrimination, and only then to determine whether the discrimination can be justified (for 
example, by the need to prevent fiscal evasion).74  Thus, the discrimination and justification 
determinations are legally and analytically distinct.  That the ECJ finds tax discrimination to be 
                                                 
68 Think, for example, of the patent and copyright clause of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const. Art I, sec. 8, cl. 8 
(giving Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). The wording of this 
clause recites the standard efficiency justification for such grants, to encourage creation of new products by 
rewarding effort.     
69 TFEU Arts. 28.1, 34 and 35 (also banning other charges having equivalent effect).  
70 Comite Intergouvernemental Cree Par La Conference De Messine, Rapport Des Chefs De De1egation Aux 
Ministres Des Affaires Etrangres, Doc. MAE 120 f/56 (1956) [hereinafter the Spaak Report].  
71 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1036. 
72 We do not find an approach that begins with a definition, such as defining tax discrimination as equal 
taxation, to be helpful.  Because the norm of tax nondiscrimination is derived from the free movement principles, 
not the other way around, such an approach does not provide a conceptual underpinning for the free movement 
principles. 
73 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1129 (citing commentators, but not cases). Cases that they do not 
cite, but seem to be referring to, in which the ECJ took member states’ revenue concerns into consideration, did so 
in the justification stage of the ruling, not the discrimination stage.  Even the language they quote from Professor 
Joachim Englisch reflects this when he says that “the ECJ has been particularly inclined to uphold discriminatory 
tax provisions based on the rule of reason…”).  Id. at 1129, n. 45 (emphasis added).  
74 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1036. 
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justified in light of other, non-efficiency, values does not imply that the discrimination 
determination itself is not informed by solely or primarily by efficiency. 
 
Moreover, any claim that a criterion other than efficiency carries greater weight in tax 
discrimination determinations simply cannot be supported by the decisions of the ECJ.75  Thus, 
in adopting economic efficiency as “the most important norm” for tax discrimination, we take 
our cue directly from the Court.  If we were starting from scratch and were charged with 
designing a single market and were asked, “Ought there to be a tax nondiscrimination principle, 
and if so, what should it mean?” we might give more weight to non-efficiency goals.  Indeed, 
after showing in our article that the Court’s tax discrimination interpretations accord better with 
competitive neutrality than with the other efficiency norms of locational neutrality or leisure 
neutrality, we showed how a competitive neutrality interpretation of tax nondiscrimination would 
promote other values, such as representation reinforcement, political unity, legal certainty, and so 
on.76  So we agree with Graetz and Warren about the importance of those values.  But, as our 
goal was to figure out what the EU treaties require, we focused on efficiency because, among 
other reasons, that’s what the ECJ does. 
 
Perhaps Graetz and Warren’s statement that economic efficiency is too narrow a focus for 
constitutional courts is meant to convey the idea that the fundamental freedoms are not only 
about efficiency, but also advance other non-economic, social issues.  We do not disagree.  
Consequently, we have no objection in theory to courts articulating other values in parallel with 
competitiveness, whether related to efficiency or not and whether derived from the same or 
different treaty sources.77  But exploring the economic efficiency values that motivate the 
                                                 
75 Graetz and Warren state, “[n]or do we agree with Mason and Knoll that the ECJ has declared economic 
efficiency to be the most important underlying value in resolving these tax cases.” Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 
Yale L.J. at 1129.  But they cite no cases in support of any alternative proposition.    
76 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1097-1106. 
77 For example the Supreme Court interprets the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause to protect both 
political as well as economic rights, such as the right to make a living.  Our approach does not have anything to say 
about the protection of noneconomic rights, but it certainly does not in any way suggest that the ECJ would be 
wrong to derive political rights from the fundamental freedoms.  Nor would we say that the Supreme Court is wrong 
in interpreting the Privileges and Immunities Clause to protect non-economic rights of citizenship in addition to 
economic rights.   
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fundamental freedoms is not a wrongheaded project, even if the fundamental freedoms also 
pursue other values.78 
 
2. Translating Capital Neutrality Benchmarks into Labor Benchmarks 
Graetz and Warren argue that the familiar capital neutrality benchmarks (especially CON) 
cannot be adapted to analyze labor, and therefore it makes no sense to analyze tax discrimination 
against cross-border workers in terms of such concepts. 
 
As best we can discern, the phrase “capital ownership neutrality” (CON), was first used by 
Michael Devereux in 1990 in an unpublished paper.79  It first appeared in print in a 1994 article 
by Robert Green, which incidentally was about tax discrimination, albeit in the context of 
bilateral tax treaties.80  The concept of ownership neutrality started to receive substantial 
attention when it was advocated by Mihir Desai and James Hines in a series of articles published 
beginning in 2003.81  In those articles, Desai and Hines presented a normative argument that the 
failure of tax policymakers to advance CON has substantial negative welfare consequences.  
They advocated refocusing the direction of international tax policy in order to achieve or come 
closer to CON.  The welfare argument that Desai and Hines make, especially claims about the 
relative size of any welfare distortions, is complicated, and it has been vigorously debated.82  
                                                 
78 Another possible interpretation of their claim is that the reasons or justifications behind a provision, even one 
that is closely associated with economic efficiency, might extend beyond economic efficiency. Graetz has argued 
elsewhere that the justification for many policies and principles, including economic principles, such as capital 
export neutrality, might not be economic efficiency, but fairness.  Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: 
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, PAGE (2001).  If 
Graetz and Warren are arguing that there are reasons other than efficiency for adopting the fundamental freedoms, 
we do not disagree.   
79 Michael P. Devereux, Capital Export Neutrality, Capital Import Neutrality, Capital Ownership Neutrality and 
All That (June 11, 1990) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors). 
80 See Robert A. Green, The Troubled Rule of Nondiscrimination in Taxing Foreign Direct Investment, 26 L. & 
POL’Y INT’L BUS.  113, 138 (1994) (“[o]wnership neutrality prevails if the international tax system is neutral with 
respect to the identity of the firm that owns and controls capital in a given country”). Professor Green’s employment 
of this notion in the tax treaty nondiscrimination context shows that it is intuitive to conceive of legal prohibitions on 
tax discrimination as seeking to prevent violations of competitive neutrality. 
81 See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 487, 
494 (2003); Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a Global 
Setting, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 937 (2004); Mihir A. Desai, New Foundations for Taxing Multinational Corporations, 
TAXES, Mar. 2004; James R. Hines Jr., Reconsidering the Taxation of Foreign Income, 62 TAX L. REV. 269 (2009). 
82 See, e.g., Mitchell A. Kane, Ownership Neutrality, Ownership Distortions, and International Tax Welfare 
Benchmarks, 26 VA. TAX REV. 53 (2006) (arguing that we lack empirical evidence that current methods of double 
tax relief cause ownership distortions that are distinct from locational distortions);  Mitchell A Kane, Considering 
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Their formal economic argument includes a number of assumptions, such as the assumption that 
capital is instantly mobile whereas labor is fixed, or at least that capital is much more mobile 
than is labor.  If the assumption of the relative immobility of labor as compared to capital is 
important for the argument that there can be significant welfare gains from pursuing one or more 
capital neutrality benchmarks, it might be difficult to make claims about the relative importance 
of pursuing labor neutrality benchmarks.  At the very least, as Graetz and Warren point out, if 
one is going to make such normative claims, the argument needs to be constructed.  Accordingly, 
Graetz and Warren criticize us for employing the labor analog of CON and using it without 
having laid the appropriate groundwork.83 
 
Such an argument again confuses the scope of our doctrinal project with the normative 
project that they would have preferred we undertake.  We are not making a welfare economics 
argument.  We are not claiming that, if one were designing a tax system from the ground up, 
achieving competitive neutrality for jobs would enhance welfare more than some other system.  
Rather, our project is interpretive.  Our reading of the cases and text led us to conclude that the 
tax nondiscrimination principle requires a level playing field between out-of-state and in-state 
providers of labor, capital, services, and business establishment.84  We use the language of 
economics, namely CON and what we outline as the labor analog to CON, to give formal content 
to the requirement of a level playing field.  The controversial welfare arguments that Desai, 
Hines, and others have made in the capital context advocating CON may not have the same force 
in the labor context.  But that doesn’t mean that the ECJ’s interpretation of tax nondiscrimination 
is not animated by the desire to root out protectionism and promote competitiveness in both 
capital and labor.  Our argument is not that we (or the ECJ) conducted a careful study of welfare 
economics and concluded that a competitive neutrality interpretation of tax discrimination would 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Reconsidering the Taxation of Foreign Income”, 62 TAX L. REV. 301 (2009) (comparing the methods of achieving 
CON and arguing that global adoption of worldwide taxation would be better than global exemption); Stephen E. 
Shay, Commentary Ownership Neutrality and Practical Complications, 62 TAX L. REV. 317 (2009) (arguing that 
due to the flexibility of forms of ownership of assets, the link between taxation and ownership neutrality may be 
weaker than suggested by advocates of CON); Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler, Corporate Taxes in the World 
Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-Border Income, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES AND 
IMPLICATIONS 319 (John W. Diamond & George R. Zodrow eds., 2008) (arguing that the welfare effects of each of 
the neutrality benchmarks is presently indeterminate whereas theoretical discussions of such welfare effects rely on 
very simple models).  
83 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1132-5. 
84 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L. J. at 1085-1106. 
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be best for Europe.  Rather, our argument is that, in interpreting the text of the treaties in light of 
the goals of the EU, the ECJ regards competiveness as the principal value pursued by the concept 
of tax nondiscrimination in all the areas covered by the fundamental freedoms.  Because we used 
the labor tax cases to illustrate our arguments, we expressed the value of “competitiveness” in 
terms of what we described as a labor analog to CON.  We used the CON concept because it is 
familiar to our readers. We readily agree that we do not perform the groundwork to establish 
competitive neutrality as a crucial normative goal for cross-border tax policy.  That was not our 
goal, and it was not necessary for our project.  All we needed to do for our project was to 
translate the economic idea of a level playing field into the labor context.85  The notion that taxes 
can distort competition between workers is an intuitive and straightforward concept to 
incorporate in the labor context.86 
 
3. Focus on Cross-border Workers and Assumption of Fixed Residence 
Graetz and Warren also take issue with our focus on cross-border workers and our 
simplifying assumption that a worker’s residence is fixed.  Since our responses to those 
criticisms are related, we consider them together.  First, Graetz and Warren claim that by 
narrowing our focus to the tax treatment of what we label “cross-border workers”—people who 
commute across state borders for work or who earn labor income from more than one member 
state in a single tax year—we neglect a more important issue, namely, workers who permanently 
change their residence for tax reasons.87 
 
The legal problem we chose to analyze—namely, “what is tax discrimination?”—dictated our 
decision to focus (only) on cross-border workers.  As we explained in our article, the legal 
prohibition on tax discrimination generally does not apply to workers who permanently change 
their state of residence in response to taxes.88  The reason for that is straight-forward.  If a 
taxpayer permanently moves to another state where she earns all her income, the new state will 
tax her as a resident with purely domestic income.  This is a case of domestic law applied to an 
                                                 
85 That is not to say that there are not subtleties in the application, which are often overlooked. 
86 Indeed, the fact that CIN has long been and still is widely interpreted as focusing on competitiveness is 
evidence of the intuitive appeal of competitiveness.  See Michael S. Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax 
Neutrality, 64 Tax. L. Rev. 99, 110-18 (2011). 
87 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1134-35. 
88 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale  L. J. at 1038-39. 
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“insider” with no cross-border activities.  To illustrate, if, rather than commuting to 
Luxembourg, a Belgian resident permanently moves to Luxembourg and earns all her income in 
Luxembourg, Luxembourg will tax her like any other Luxembourger.  This is an artifact of the 
tax law; states generally use tax residence, rather than nationality, to determine how they will 
exercise tax jurisdiction.  The Luxembourgish tax law therefore sees only residents and 
nonresidents; it generally would not see old residents and new residents (or Luxembourg 
nationals and everybody else).  EU tax discrimination law says nothing about how Luxembourg 
should tax its own residents’ exclusively domestic-source income.  The legal concept of tax 
discrimination simply does not apply to such “purely internal” situations.89  That’s not especially 
surprising.  We usually think of discrimination as adverse treatment of outsiders.  It would be 
surprising indeed if discrimination in the EU tax context were interpreted to cover a member 
state’s treatment of its own resident’s purely domestic income. 
 
To extend our example, should the new Luxembourg resident now decide to remain in 
Luxembourg, but earn labor income from Germany so that there was a cross border element, EU 
tax discrimination law would apply to her, and she would now fall into our category of “cross-
border workers.”  Our “cross-border worker” is just someone who has labor income from a state 
other than (or in addition to) her residence state.90  By focusing explicitly on the kinds of 
situations covered by the legal prohibition of tax discrimination, we do not mean to suggest that 
residence distortions are unimportant as a policy or efficiency matter.  We considered only the 
set of taxpayers protected by the EU prohibition on tax discrimination because we were 
interested in the meaning of that particular legal concept.  Were we instead interested in the 
normative project of eliminating the largest tax-induced economic distortions to work in Europe, 
we might have taken a wider focus.91 
                                                 
89 According to Judge Koen Lenaerts, Vice President of the ECJ and Professor at the Catholic University of 
Leuven, “[s]ince the ‘pervasiveness’ of EU law only applies to cross-border situations, purely internal situations are 
not affected.” Koen Lenaerts, Federalism and the Rule of Law: Perspectives from the European Court of Justice, 33 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1338, 1341 (2010). See also Case C-112/91, Werner v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, 1993 
E.C.R. I-429, ¶¶ 16-17 (rejecting a taxpayer’s claim of tax discrimination because the facts presented a “purely 
national” situation to which fundamental freedoms did not apply). 
90 Residence, of course, is a legal status.  Accordingly, one way to reduce residence distortions would be to 
change the test used to determine residence. 
91 We note that Graetz and Warren give no evidence of the importance or magnitude of workers changing their 
state of residence.  The only evidence they give in support of their claim that cross-border workers issues are 
unimportant is to recognize that 25 percent of the tax discrimination cases, which equates to about 2 percent of all 
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Relatedly, Graetz and Warren claim that our argument for a competitive neutrality 
interpretation of tax discrimination is based on the “unrealistic” assumption that a taxpayer’s 
residence is fixed.92  Graetz and Warren argue that this assumption is too restrictive if one is 
trying to undertake a complete welfare analysis of the tax consequences of various rules or 
interpretations.93  We do not disagree.  We acknowledge that tax residence rules, such as the 
dominant one in the European Union, whereby one becomes a resident of a new state after living 
there for 6 months,94 will create distortions.  Those distortions will interact with other distortions 
complicating any welfare calculations.95  That is true, but irrelevant.  Again, that argument 
confuses our interpretive project with their welfare economics project.96  Our interpretation does 
not depend upon any such assumption.  Our simplifying assumption that workers cannot move is 
used to illustrate how our approach works; it is not used to justify or support our argument for a 
competitive neutrality interpretation of tax discrimination.97 
 
Graetz and Warren also criticize us for ending up with a theory of sharply limited 
applicability.98  They claim that our “entire analysis [is based on] the unrealistic assumption that 
EU citizens will not take a job in another country if they have to live in the other country for 
more than six months.”99  In addition, they claim our analysis is inapplicable to capital 
investments where the assumption that residence is fixed “is patently implausible.”100  We 
disagree with those claims. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
ECJ cases,  involve labor income. Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1137.  We fail to see how this is 
probative, especially since there are even fewer cases involving workers who change their state of tax residence. 
92 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1135-39. 
93 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1137-38. 
94 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1135. 
95 There are numerous complex issues, such as the source of income, the question of what is a tax, the 
determination of what expenditures or services should be treated as offsets to taxation, that interact with any tax 
system and can complicated the administration of tax policy and the determination of what is the welfare 
maximizing policy.     
96 In several places, Graetz and Warren discuss how various tax rules can interact with one another and cause 
jobs (or the demand for labor) to shift across locations.  
97 Our response to Graetz and Warren’s claim that an assumption of fixed residence undercuts our policy 
prescriptions are taken up later.  See note _ - _ infra and accompanying text. 
98 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1139. 
99 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1135.   
100 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1136. 
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Start with their claim that we assume EU nationals will not take a job in another country if 
they have to live there for more than six months.101  What we actually say is that when an 
individual has to change residence in order to take a new job, the doctrine of tax discrimination is 
inapplicable because the taxpayer resides in the same state where he earns his income.102  EU 
commentators refer to this as a “purely internal” situation, whereas the concept of tax 
nondiscrimination only applies to cross-border activity.103  Thus, our decision to follow the lead 
of the ECJ by excluding such movement from our analysis of tax discrimination was appropriate.    
Moreover, although the ECJ has not applied the tax discrimination concept to the kinds of cases 
that concern Graetz and Warren but that are not covered by our analysis (i.e., those in which an 
EU national changes her residence and then earns purely domestic income in her new residence 
state), the TFEU may nonetheless offer protection in those cases.104 
                                                 
101 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1135 (“Mason and Knoll therefore base their entire analysis on an 
assumption that EU citizens will not take a job in another country if they have to live in the other country for more 
than six months”). 
102 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 YALE L. J. at 1038-9. 
103 See references infra  note ___. 
104 Change-of-residence cases generally involve the extra-territorial assertion by the former residence state of 
exit, inheritance, or pension taxes.  Thus, they too involve a cross-border element, as they must to trigger the 
application of the fundamental freedoms.  But these cases have been decided under the rubric “restriction,” rather 
than “discrimination.” See, e.g., Case C-9/02, De Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et 
de l’Industrie, 2004 E.C.R. I-2409, ¶ 45 (finding that the French exit tax “restricted” the freedom of establishment). 
Restrictions were not the focus of our article.  See infra Part I.B.4. 
Although no such case has yet arisen in the ECJ, we can imagine tax discrimination (rather than restriction) 
cases involving discrimination against new residents.  When such cases have arisen in the United States, the 
Supreme Court has analyzed them under the nondiscrimination principles embodied in the Privileges and 
Immunities or Equal Protection Clauses.  See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 12 (1992) (holding that 
California’s Proposition 13A, which based property taxes on 1975–76 assessments did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause in spite of the law’s less favorable treatment of new residents because the rule was rationally 
related to the state’s goal to encourage “neighborhood preservation, continuity, and stability”).  Thus, while we do 
not completely rule out the possibility that change-of-residence cases will be incorporated into the ECJ’s tax 
discrimination doctrine, it seems to us prudent for now to focus on the kinds of cases that have actually arisen before 
the Court.  Moreover, if cases involving discrimination against new residents were to arise, they would fit 
comfortably within our conceptual framework because the challenged laws in such cases would tilt the playing field 
against external interests. 
But, in our view, the change-of residence tax cases with a cross-border element (e.g., pension, exit, or 
inheritance taxes) and hypotheticals in which member states discriminate against new residents do not represent 
what’s really at stake for Graetz and Warren.  They seem to want to know whether the TFEU aims to reduce tax 
residence distortions, regardless of whether the taxpayer who changes residence continues to be involved in cross-
border economic activities.  We do not know enough to answer this question.  While the ECJ has not interpreted the 
tax nondiscrimination principle to advance that particular notion residence neutrality, other parts of the TFEU may 
advance that goal.  Note, however, that at least some cases, including tax cases, suggest that rather than promoting 
residence neutrality, the TFEU aims to promote what is essentially the opposite of residence neutrality, namely, 
competition for residents.  This can be seen in the corporate charter competition cases such as Centros and Inspire 
Art, in which the ECJ held that an EU national did not abuse its rights under the TFEU when it established a 
corporate presence in a state with a favorable regulatory regime for the purpose of being governed by that regime 
when it entered the market of a second member state.  The ability to take advantage of a home state regulatory 
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More broadly, Graetz and Warren assert that our analysis of tax discrimination is 
inapplicable to capital because investors can change their residence.  We agree with their 
observation that investors can change their residence.  We fail, however, to see how that 
observation undercuts our interpretation of tax discrimination or renders that interpretation 
inapplicable to investors (or corporations).  Although investors might be readily able to move, at 
any point in time, they must reside somewhere.  Their investments are also located somewhere, 
perhaps in many different states.  Such cross-border investors could potentially be the target of 
tax discrimination.  Host states, for example, might seek to discourage investments (especially 
controlling investments) from abroad.  Also, residence states might try to discourage their 
residents from investing abroad.  The EU as a whole, as well as particular investors, therefore 
both stand to benefit from the prevention of such tax discrimination.  We, thus, fail to see how 
the ability of investors (and service providers) to change residence somehow makes tax 
discrimination (which only applies to cross-border investments and provisions of services) 
unimportant.105 
 
4. The Relationship between Discrimination and Restriction 
Much of the rest of Graetz and Warren’s criticism stems from their conflation of the 
analytically distinct EU law concepts of “discrimination” and “restriction.”  Our original article 
dealt only with the former, but much of Graetz and Warren’s criticism seems to lament that we 
did not address the latter.106  For example, Graetz and Warren give an example of a charity that 
faces new requirements when it seeks to expand its operations into a neighboring EU member 
                                                                                                                                                             
regime when doing business abroad would promote competitive neutrality, but it would distort where corporations 
choose to reside.  See Case C-212/97, Centros, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459 (upholding right under the freedom of 
establishment of Danish nationals to incorporate a company in the United Kingdom that did no business in the 
United Kingdom, but rather was incorporated there for the express purpose of being governed by favorable U.K. law 
when transacting business through a secondary establishment in Denmark), Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel 
en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-10155, ¶121 (holding, on facts similar to those in 
Centros, that to subject branches to the domestic corporate law of the host member state would impede their right of 
establishment). 
The promotion of regulatory competition also can be seen in the compensatory tax cases, such as Eurowings, in 
which the ECJ held that a member states was not justified in assessing an additional tax on nonresidents to make up 
for the fact that they were taxed more lightly at home.  Case C-294/97, Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG v. Finanzamt 
Dortmund-Unna, 1999 E.C.R. I-7447. Permitting compensatory taxation would tend to promote both locational and 
residence neutrality, but it would violate competitive neutrality.  Finally, as discussed in the next Part, in our view, 
the mutual recognition principle promotes competitive neutrality over locational neutrality.  See infra Part I.B.4. 
105 Graetz and Warren also assert that our assumption of fixed residence undercuts our policy recommendations.  
That is an issue we discuss below. 
106 See Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1126-29. 
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state.107  In Graetz and Warren’s example, the new host state applies its requirements on the 
same basis to all charities operating in its territory—regardless of whether those charities are 
established domestically or abroad.  Because the multi-state charity must satisfy the requirements 
of both its home and host states, while domestic charities need satisfy the requirements of only 
one state, the charity operating across borders faces additional burdens.  For example, if both the 
home and host states of the charity required the charity to the keep financial records according to 
national accounting rules, the charity would face duplicative burdens. 
 
Similarly, Graetz and Warren refer to another restriction case, Cassis de Dijon.108 In 
Cassis, Germany tried to exclude an imported liquor because it did not meet the minimum 
alcohol content for liquor under German regulations.  But the liquor, which was manufactured in 
France, complied with French liquor regulations.  The German law was not facially 
discriminatory; Germany did not have one set of standards for liquor manufactured abroad and 
another set for liquor manufactured in Germany.  Rather, German standards simply were 
different from French standards.  The ECJ held that, notwithstanding the universal applicability 
of the regulation, Germany imposed an “obstacle”109 on cross-border trade because goods would 
have trouble satisfying the standards of both Germany and the state of manufacture.  As Graetz 
and Warren note, the ECJ’s solution in Cassis was to select an origin state rule for goods.  This 
origin state rule came to be known as the “mutual recognition” principle, and under it goods 
manufactured in one member state are presumptively free to circulate throughout the European 
Union, as long as they satisfy the regulatory scheme of their state of manufacture.110  So 
Germany must accept the French liquor manufactured to French standards. 
 
                                                 
107 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1126-27. 
108 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1126.  See also  Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwien (Cassis de Dijon) 1979 E.C.R. 649.  Notice also that, unlike the other 
cases and examples cited by Graetz and Warren and us, Cassis was a case involving the free movement of goods.  
Direct tax discrimination analysis does not generally implicate the freedom of movement of good because goods are 
the subject of indirect taxes (like VAT), rather than direct taxes (like income taxes).    Competitive neutrality in the 
area of goods would involve producers from different states competing on a level playing field to sell goods in a 
given market. 
109 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwien (Cassis de Dijon) 1979 
E.C.R. 649, ¶¶ 14-15 (holding that excluding the French liquor “constitute[d] an obstacle to trade” that  qualified as 
a measure “having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports” and was therefore prohibited  under 
Article 30 EEC. 
110 See Communication from the Commission "Mutual recognition in the context of the follow-up of the action 
plan for the single market" [COM(1999) 299 final - Not published in the Official Journal]. 
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Citing mutual recognition, Graetz and Warren would like the ECJ to choose a particular 
state’s tax law to govern cross-border situations.  Specifically, they suggest that the only sensible 
way for the ECJ to enforce the prohibition on tax discrimination would be to pick one of the 
following options:  (1) to apply the source country’s tax system (destination state rule), (2) to 
apply the residence country’s tax system (origin state rule akin to mutual recognition) or (3) to 
harmonize the source and residence country’s tax systems.111  However, although Graetz and 
Warren’s approach would cure restrictions that arise from the application of duplicative or 
conflicting regulatory regimes like that seen in Cassis (for example, it would eliminate double 
juridical taxation), it would not necessarily cure discrimination.  For example, it would do 
nothing to preclude source or residence rules of the following format:  “purely domestic 
activities are taxed at 15%, but cross-border activities are taxed at 30%.”  None of the three 
proposals above by Graetz and Warren would address this problem, even though we would assert 
that preventing this sort of protectionist tax law lies at the heart of the nondiscrimination project. 
 
Relatedly, the ECJ has expressly held that the nondiscrimination principle does not require 
the member states to relieve double juridical taxation.112  So the fact that Graetz and Warren’s 
approach solves double juridical taxation (admittedly a major problem that tends to inhibit 
integration in a common market) doesn’t mean that their approach addresses discrimination.  
Double taxation, like multiple regulatory burdens, at least in the view of the ECJ so far does not 
present a problem of discrimination.  We would characterize double taxation, like multiple 
regulatory burdens, as creating restrictions.113  That is, double taxation inhibits cross-border 
commerce even though each taxing state’s regime may apply in an even-handed way (i.e., 
uniformly) to both residents and nonresidents working in the jurisdiction (or to residents’ 
foreign- and domestic-source income).  While commentators have criticized the ECJ for failing 
to adequately distinguish “discriminations” from “restrictions” in the tax area, the two concepts 
can be distinguished analytically, and mutual recognition for taxation will not necessarily cure 
cases of tax discrimination.  Thus, neither the multi-state charity in Graetz and Warren’s 
                                                 
111 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1126-27. 
112 See, e.g., Case C-128/08, Damseaux v. Belgium, 2009 E.C.R. I-6823, ¶ 25; Case C-513/04, Kerckhaert & 
Morres v. Belgium, 2006 E.C.R. 1-10967, paras. 20-24. 
113 See Georg Kofler & Ruth Mason, Double Taxation: A European “Switch in Time?” 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 
63 (2007) (comparing the ECJ’s double regulatory burdens cases to double taxation).  
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hypothetical nor the liquor manufacturer in Cassis faced “discrimination.”114  We would add that 
probably the best U.S. analog to the restriction/discrimination dichotomy can be found in the 
dormant Commerce Clause, which forbids both “discrimination” and non-discriminatory (or 
“facially-neutral”) “undue burdens.”115 
 
We did not consider tax restrictions because our project focused exclusively on 
discrimination.  Restrictions are a complicated subject that has produced its own jurisprudence, 
literature, and debate.  Restrictions are well beyond what we covered in our original article, and 
there is not enough space to do them justice in this sur-reply.116  One reason that we focused in 
our article on discrimination rather than restrictions is that, so far, the ECJ has decided the vast 
majority of its direct tax cases under the discrimination rubric, reserving its restriction analysis 
for non-tax regulations.117  That said, we offer a few brief comments here in response to Graetz 
and Warren’s critique. 
 
One reason for the ECJ’s differential treatment of taxes and non-tax regulations could be that 
taxes (even when imposed by different states using different currencies) are all in money and so 
are additive.118  If a tax of €10 is imposed by France on a French resident engaged in a specific 
activity conducted in Germany, and a tax of €5 is imposed by Germany on that same individual 
for the same activity, the total tax paid by that individual on that activity is €15.  In contrast, 
regulations are often not additive.119  That can be illustrated using Cassis.  In Cassis, the German 
regulations required a minimum alcohol content for the liquor to be sold in Germany.  Because 
French law was different, the product in question had a lower alcohol content than the German 
minimum.  Thus, to sell in Germany, the French producer would have had to change its formula 
                                                 
114 In both cases, the destination member state’s requirement applied even-handedly to all comers, whether 
foreign or domestic.  The problem in both those cases was that multi-state actors faced duplicative or conflicting 
regulations applicable in multiple states.   
115 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1148. 
116 As is widely acknowledged, the ECJ will strike down both tax and non-tax laws that discriminate.  It will 
also strike down non-tax laws (e.g., regulations) if they constitute an “impermissible restriction on cross-border 
economic activity.”  So far, however, direct tax cases primarily have been resolved on discrimination, not restriction, 
grounds. . We do plan to look more closely at restrictions in the future and to consider how well a competitiveness 
paradigm would work with restrictions and how to operationalize that standard.  
117 The ECJ has decided change-of-residence cases under the restriction concept.  See supra notes ___–___ and 
accompanying text. 
118 Roxan (2000), 63 Mod. L. Rev. at  _. 
119 Roxan (2000), 63 Mod. L. Rev. at  _. 
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for the German market.  That might have been very expensive for a variety of reasons or even 
impractical.  To make the point more starkly, France (or another country) might have had a 
regulation that did not allow the sale of alcohol above a certain level, which level was below the 
German minimum.  In such a case, it would not be possible to sell the same product in both 
countries.  Such regulations, although not discriminatory, would segment and undercut the single 
market and undermine the notion that goods produced in other states should compete on the 
same terms with domestic goods. 
 
The same logic that the ECJ applied to goods in Cassis also applies with capital investments 
and labor services.  Allowing both origin and destination state regulations to apply might 
interfere with the single market.  To eliminate restrictions (for example, to cure conflicting 
regulatory burdens), a choice has to be made about which member state’s law will apply.120 
Where regulations are not additive, only one of the origin state’s or the destination state’s law 
can apply.  In contrast, because taxes are additive, there is an option with taxes that is not 
available with regulations – to permit both source and residence taxation simultaneously so long 
as source and residence taxes are what we call uniform, that is, they apply the same way to all 
comers. Because taxes are always additive whereas regulations are not, there is an additional 
option (beyond the options Graetz and Warren consider sensible121) for designing a 
competitively neutral tax system that is not available with regulations.122  That option is to 
require uniform source and residence taxation. 
Another reason may help explain why the mutual recognition principle, which has 
successfully reduced conflicts and duplication among Member State regulatory regimes, has not 
                                                 
120 There is no general way to apply both origin and destination regulations without imposing very different 
burdens on parties from different states depending upon their origin and destination states. 
121 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at  1126-27 (describing three ways out of the labyrinth of 
impossibility: impose origin state requirements, impose destination state requirements, and harmonization) 
122 It’s important to note that the basis for the mutual recognition principle is that disparate regulatory regimes 
in different states aim to accomplish similar policy ends.  For example, even though French and German health and 
consumer protection law governing the manufacture of liquors may differ, a product manufactured to French 
standards will equally protect German buyers of the product (at least up to the level of French safety standards).  
Thus, the presumption under mutual recognition that goods manufactured in one member state are free to circulate 
in other member state is rebuttable.  See Regulation 764/2008, The “Mutual Recognition Regulation,” O.J. [2008] 
L218/21 (Jul. 9 2008) (providing procedure whereby a destination state can provide notice to a manufacture 
justifying exclusion of its product despite the mutual recognition principle, on various, but limited grounds, such as 
the need for consumer protection). Id. at ¶ 23. The notion that either state’s regulation can serve both states’ policy 
goals does not work with taxation.  Clearly, assigning to France the exclusive right to collect taxes on a cross-border 
transaction does nothing to satisfy German revenue needs. 
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been pushed into the tax area.  One basis for the mutual recognition principle is that disparate 
regulatory regimes in different states aim to accomplish similar policy ends.  For example, even 
though French and German health and consumer protection law governing the manufacture of 
liquors may differ, a product manufactured to French standards will equally protect German 
buyers of the product (at least up to the level of French safety standards).  Thus, the presumption 
under mutual recognition that goods manufactured in one member state are free to circulate in 
other member state is rebuttable.123  The notion that either state’s regulation can serve both 
states’ policy goals simply does not work with taxation.  For example, assigning to France the 
exclusive right to collect taxes on a cross-border transaction does nothing to satisfy German 
revenue needs. 
 
Interestingly, the approach the ECJ adopted in Cassis, mutual recognition of origin state 
regulation, does not aim to promote locational neutrality, which seems to be Graetz and Warren’s 
preferred welfare norm.124  On the contrary, mutual recognition overtly encourages regulatory 
competition that will influence the location of production.  Although it does not promote 
locational neutrality, mutual recognition of origin state regulation does promote competitive 
neutrality, especially if the ECJ is more worried about states restricting imports than advantaging 
exports.125  Thus Graetz and Warren’s citation to Cassis seems especially out-of-place because it 
shows that the ECJ’s interpretation of the free movement of goods does not have much to do 
with their preferred norm of locational neutrality, while at the same time it shows that the ECJ’s 
interpretation of the free movement of goods readily implicates our preferred interpretation of 
the fundamental freedoms as rooting out protectionism and promoting competitive neutrality.126 
 
Furthermore, a quick look at the ECJ’s other jurisprudence on restrictions suggests that the 
ECJ has been choosing between the origin and the destination state in a manner that promotes 
                                                 
123 See Regulation 764/2008, The “Mutual Recognition Regulation,” O.J. [2008] L218/21 (Jul. 9 2008) 
(providing procedure whereby a destination state can provide notice to a manufacture justifying exclusion of its 
product despite the mutual recognition principle, on various, but limited grounds, such as the need for consumer 
protection). Id. at ¶ 23. 
124 Rather, regulatory harmonization would be required to achieve locational neutrality in a wide range of 
circumstances. In our view, this is a big problem for any interpretation of the fundamental freedoms that emphasizes 
locational neutrality. 
125 [Cite Commission communication on page 725 of Dinnage and Laffineur.] 
126 Other lines of cases also seem to support competitive neutrality over locational neutrality, including the 
corporate charter competition cases and the compensatory tax cases.  See discussion in supra note 104. 
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competition between domestic and foreign suppliers rather than one that promotes locational 
neutrality.127  Thus, for example, the ECJ generally has decided that destination-state regulation 
will control labor and services.  Accordingly, health, safety, and work rules are generally 
determined by the destination state, not the origin state.128  As a result of this rule, domestic and 
foreign suppliers incur the same continuing and regularly incurred costs.129  Such a rule, thus, 
promotes competitive neutrality, but not locational neutrality.  However, in other areas, including 
the sale of goods, professional qualifications, driver’s licenses, and the regulation of finance and 
broadcasting, the origin state’s regulation governs.130  These costs tend to be one-time or upfront 
costs and so the alternative rule of destination-state regulation would lead suppliers to incur 
duplicative costs.  Thus, this rule also promotes competitive neutrality, but not locational 
neutrality.131  Although we readily acknowledge that a detailed discussion of regulations is 
beyond the scope of this sur-reply, our quick look does not suggest that the ECJ’s treatment of 
regulations is inconsistent with our interpretation of tax discrimination.  Rather, the ECJ seems to 
be trying to promote competitive neutrality, but not locational neutrality. 
 
5. Sources of Interpretation 
Graetz and Warren also claim that our sources do not support our interpretation of tax 
discrimination as informed by competitive neutrality.132  We built our argument for a competitive 
neutrality interpretation of tax discrimination and the fundamental freedoms on a range of 
sources.  We began with the Spaak Report, one of the few reports that was generally available 
when the Treaty of Rome was adopted in 1956.  That report made clear that one of the 
motivations behind the establishment of the European Union was to allow for the development of 
EU-based multinationals that could operate on a large scale without becoming monopolies.  That 
                                                 
127 See also discussion in supra note ___ discussing the ECJ’s rulings in Daily Mail and Eurowings, which dealt 
respectively with corporate charter competition cases and compensatory taxes.  In both these cases, the ECJ’s 
decisions vindicate regulatory competition over residence or locational neutrality,  
128 Alexander Saydé, One Law, Two Competitions:  An Enquiry into the Contradictions of Free Movement 
Law, 13 Cambridge Y.B. Eur. Legal Stud. 386 (2011). 
129 Saydé (2011), at 386 
130 Saydé (2011), at 387. 
131 Locational neutrality would require harmonization. 
132 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1155-61. Much of their argument against a competitive neutrality 
interpretation of nondiscrimination is premised on the observation that the ECJ does not strike down instances of 
reverse discrimination.  Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1156-58.  As noted above, we acknowledge the 
ECJ’s acceptance of reverse discrimination and the inconsistency of this acceptance with a competitive neutrality 
interpretation of tax discrimination. 
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motivation has nothing to do with locational neutrality, but everything to do with competitive 
neutrality.  Thus, the Spaak report supports the notion that competitive neutrality was a value 
promoted by the formation of the European Union. 
 
We also argued that the structure and language of the EU treaties supports our 
interpretation.  The treaties provide for a political process to advance harmonization, and 
harmonization produces locational neutrality.  Thus, we do not argue that the EU treaties provide 
no mechanism for advancing locational neutrality.  Rather, our argument is the fundamental 
freedoms, and in particular the tax nondiscrimination principle, advance competitive neutrality 
where member state law remains unharmonized. 
 
The language of the treaties supports our interpretation.  For example, the TFEU 
explicitly imposes obligations on both source and residence states under the fundamental 
freedoms.   The imposition of nondiscrimination obligations on both source and residence states 
is consistent with competitive neutrality, but it is inconsistent with both locational neutrality and 
leisure/savings neutrality.  Moreover, the right of business establishment appears to be unrelated 
to either locational neutrality or savings/leisure neutrality, but it is important for achieving 
competitive neutrality. 
 
We also argued that the ECJ cases fit more closely (albeit not perfectly) with competitive 
neutrality than with either locational neutrality or leisure/saving neutrality.  The ECJ’s opinions 
regularly refer to state actions that “discourage” or “deter” cross-border activity.  For the reasons 
we argue in the article, that language fits more closely with competitive neutrality than with 
locational or savings/leisure neutrality.  Moreover, the ECJ has struck down numerous source 
state tax provisions (while allowing others to stand).  Such a policy makes no sense if the ECJ’s 
goal is to promote locational neutrality.133  Similarly, the ECJ has struck down numerous 
                                                 
133 If the tax discrimination doctrine were being used to promote locational neutrality and if the member states 
adopted worldwide taxation (with unlimited foreign tax credits), then source taxation would not interfere with 
achieving locational neutrality.  Alternatively, if all states employed residence taxation, then any source taxation 
would interfere with locational neutrality. 
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residence state tax provisions (while allowing others to stand).  Such a policy makes no sense if 
the ECJ’s goal is to promote savings/leisure neutrality.134 
 
In addition, other aspects of the nondiscrimination jurisprudence support a competitive 
neutrality interpretation.  For example, we argue that the EU doctrine of “direct effect” allows 
affected parties to sue their own and other member states for tax discrimination.  The doctrine of 
direct effect fits comfortably with a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination 
because a tax that violates competitive neutrality harms identifiable taxpayers, whereas when 
taxes compromise locational neutrality, they reduce returns for everyone, rather than for specific, 
identifiable taxpayers. 
 
Although Graetz and Warren take issue with some elements of our interpretation, they do not 
challenge other elements.  For example, at least in their response, they do not challenge our 
interpretation of the Spaak report.  But Graetz and Warren do disagree with our claim that the 
right of establishment would be superfluous if the tax nondiscrimination principle were 
interpreted to promote locational neutrality.135  Yet the notion that free movement of portfolio 
investment (which is covered by the freedom of capital movement) is sufficient to achieve an 
efficient distribution of global capital (i.e., to achieve locational neutrality) is the basis for the 
standard argument that CON should not be considered an important neutrality benchmark.  If 
foreign direct investment by multinationals was needed to achieve locational neutrality, then the 
argument for CON at the level of the firm would be closely tied with the argument for CEN.  
CON would be a prerequisite for CEN.  The argument that CON is not important is thus based 
on a view that CEN can be achieved without CON.  Of course, what this requires is that portfolio 
capital be highly mobile, which it is widely acknowledged to be. 
 
As for the cases, Graetz and Warren claim that we endorse competitive neutrality by relying 
on the language of cases, but we reject locational neutrality and leisure/saving neutrality as 
inconsistent with the outcomes of the cases.  They claim that a more even-handed analysis would 
not favor competitive neutrality, although they do not offer any examples in support of this 
                                                 
134 Savings/leisure neutrality, the term we use for CIN and its labor analog, requires source state taxation only.  
135 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale  L. J. at 1158-59. 
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claim.  In our view, neither the language nor the outcomes of the cases supports a locational or 
savings/leisure neutrality interpretation of the fundamental freedoms or tax discrimination.  First, 
we are not aware of any language in the cases that shows support for leisure/saving neutrality.  
There is some language that supports locational neutrality in conjunction with competitive 
neutrality (this makes sense, since the two neutrality benchmarks can be achieved simultaneously 
and are at times confused for one another136).  But there is also much language that explicitly 
rejects locational neutrality, whereas we are not aware of language explicitly rejecting 
competitive neutrality. 
 
Finally, Graetz and Warren dispute our claim that the doctrine of direct effect provides 
support for a competitive neutrality interpretation of tax nondiscrimination.  They argue that 
locational neutrality violations also produce winners and losers, and they offer a brief example of 
two firms based in one country.  One firm is purely domestic and the other is a multinational.  
Graetz and Warren note that an increase in the source tax rate faced by the multinational abroad 
will harm the multinational firm, but not the purely domestic firm.137  In order to evaluate their 
argument, consider the following example.  Assume there are two firms from Slovakia.  One 
firm is purely domestic, whereas the other is a multinational with operations in both Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic.  Assume initially that Slovakia and the Czech Republic have the same tax 
system, which includes a flat 25% tax rate on corporations and only source-based corporate 
taxation.  The resulting tax system is locationally neutral because it is harmonized.  Assume the 
Czech Republic subsequently raises its corporate tax rate from 25% to 30%.  That will harm the 
Slovakian multinational relative to the purely domestic Slovakian firm.  In that event, there is 
both injury to a firm and a violation of locational neutrality.  That seems to be what Graetz and 
Warren have in mind when they say the doctrine of direct effect can be applied to locational 
neutrality as well as competitive neutrality.  But now assume that Slovakia subsequently raises 
its tax rate to 30% (in order to equal to the Czech rate).  That tax increase will harm Czech 
multinationals with operations in Slovakia relative to purely domestic Czech firms, but it does 
not compromise locational neutrality.  Instead, it restores it.  If taxpayer injury is being used to 
identify violations of locational neutrality, this is a false positive.  Assume after raising its 
                                                 
136 See note – infra. 
137 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L. J. at 1156, n. 139. 
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corporate tax rate to 30%, the Czech Republic subsequently decides to reduce that rate back to 
25% (while Slovakia maintains its 30% corporate tax rate).  The resulting tax rate decrease 
compromises locational neutrality.  Yet, there is no injury to any firm.  This is a false negative.  
As the above example illustrates, injury to individual taxpayers is poorly associated with 
violations of locational neutrality. 
 
We make this point more sharply by imagining once again that Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic both start out taxing corporations on a purely source basis at 25%,  As noted, this 
harmonized tax system is locationally neutral.  Now suppose that the Czech Republic again 
decides to raise its rate to 30%.  As long as the Czech Republic imposes the tax uniformly, so 
that it applies the same way to domestic and foreign corporations, it will create only a locational, 
and not a competitive distortion.  Is that tax discrimination because, on Graetz and Warren’s 
reading it may injure the Slovakian multinational?  If a firm were to argue that the even-handed 
application by a member state of tax rates that were higher than another state’s rates were 
discriminatory, the firm would lose, and it should lose.  Taken at face value, if the ECJ were to 
hold that a member state discriminated simply by raising its tax rates in an even-handed way for 
all economic actors within its territory as Graetz and Warren suggest,138 the Court would lock in 
tax policy indefinitely, or at least it would preclude tax increases.139 
 
6. Concluding Observations 
Interpreting treaties and cases is not an exact science; rarely do all of the factors point in only 
one direction.  At the end of the day, one is often left making a decision among a range of 
plausible alternatives.  An interesting question to ask in this case is:  If the tax nondiscrimination 
principle does not require competitive neutrality, what does it require?  In this vein, we would 
note that there is a substantial amount of academic commentary that has tended to interpret the 
tax nondiscrimination principle as promoting competitiveness or something akin to it.  Among 
the prominent commentators who have taken such a position is Wolfgang Schön, who argues 
                                                 
138 Graetz & Warren, 121 Yale L.J. at 1156 n. 139. 
139 This brings us back to Graetz and Warren’s criticism that we should have analyzed differential tax rates 
because such differences may cause the largest tax-induced distortions in Europe.  But, even if rate differentials 
cause the largest tax-induced distortions to intra-EU commerce, the ECJ has expressly stated that rate differentials 
are not discriminatory, as long as they apply even-handedly to all comers.  This may be regrettable in Graetz and 
Warren’s view, but since our goal was to gain insight into the Court’s definition of tax discrimination, our 
interpretive theory would have been wrong had we not taken the ECJ’s views on rate differentials into account. 
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that “[t]he fundamental freedoms of the EC treaty . . . primarily serve to guarantee access to each 
national market to economic subjects from other [m]ember [s]tates.”140  Professor Schön further 
argues that “[t]he fundamental freedoms in their current shape as prohibitions of discrimination 
and restrictions correspond to these requirements: on the one hand, the prohibition of 
discrimination forces the country of investment or activity to establish capital import neutrality 
within its domestic tax system.  At the same time, the (former) country of residence of a taxpayer 
must not unreasonably hinder the export of monetary, real or human capital.”141  As Graetz and 
Warren point out, this is similar to the practical implication of our interpretation of tax 
discrimination as promoting competitive neutrality.  Specifically, member states must limit 
themselves to enacting uniform source and uniform residence rules. 
 
Ian Roxan also interprets tax discrimination along lines similar to ours.  Professor Roxan 
describes the fundamental freedoms as concerned not with the “incentives to move,” but with the 
“cost of movement.”  In Roxan’s view, there is an incentive to move when nationals of both the 
origin and destination state have an economic incentive to move (or stay) that operates in the 
same direction.  Thus, a higher tax rate in Estonia than Latvia encourages both Estonians and 
Latvians to work in Latvia rather than in Estonia.  In contrast, a cost to move operates on one 
party and in one direction.  A tax imposed only on Latvians who work in Estonia will discourage 
Latvians from working in Estonia, but it will have no direct effect on Estonians.  Although 
Roxan does not use the language of CEN to describe “incentives to move” or the language of 
CON to describe “cost of movement,” the notions appear to be similar. 
 
Even Graetz and Warren in their earlier work interpreted the fundamental freedoms and tax 
discrimination along the lines of competitive neutrality.  For example, in a 2000 article upon 
which Graetz and Warren heavily relied in their 2006 article, Warren writing alone stated that 
that international tax law conceptualizes tax laws that favor domestic producers over foreign 
producers as a matter of discrimination.142  In contrast, according to Warren, international tax 
law conceptualizes tax policies that favor domestic production over foreign production not as a 
                                                 
140 Wolfgang Schön, Tax Competition in Europe – the legal perspective, EC Tax Rev. 90, 97 (2002). 
141 Schön (2002), EC Tax Rev. at 98 (footnotes omitted). 
142 Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 Tax L. Rev. 131, 150 
(2000). 
35 
 
matter of discrimination, but rather as a matter of double taxation.143  Moreover in that 2000 
article, Warren went on to conclude that “[t]he competitiveness norm would seem more 
consistent with the current scope of prohibited discrimination than is the efficiency norm.”144   
Warren equated the efficiency norm with locational neutrality or CEN.145  Although he was 
primarily discussing trade and tax treaty nondiscrimination, Warren’s discussion shows that tax 
discrimination has long concerned promoting competition between in-state and cross-border 
actors.  Thus, it is perhaps no surprise that the judges of the ECJ would come to similar 
conclusions. 
 
Drawing on Warren’s 2000 article, in their 2006 article Graetz and Warren describe tax 
discrimination as concerned with discrimination against foreign producers as opposed to foreign 
production.146  To us that seems very close to selecting CON over CEN as the motivating 
concept behind tax discrimination.147  If that is not clear enough, they are more clear elsewhere 
in that article.  For example, Graetz and Warren discuss the dangers of stripping the ECJ of 
power to review tax policies, which they say would likely lead to a rapid expansion of 
protectionist tax legislation.  They then offer a possible “middle ground between the limited 
nondiscrimination requirements of international tax and trade treaties and the unduly inhibiting 
version of nondiscrimination fashioned by the ECJ.”148  “One alternative,” according to Graetz 
and Warren, “might be a slowing of ECJ intervention with more attention to the effect on the 
member states’ fisc and a greater emphasis on protectionism as a potential middle ground.  The 
court’s inquiry might, for example, be directed to whether the intent of the provision was 
protectionist.”149  Because competitively neutral provisions are designed to eliminate 
protectionism, we read the above statement by Graetz and Warren as accepting competitive 
neutrality as a reasonable interpretation of the EU concept of tax nondiscrimination, even if they 
                                                 
143 Warren (2000), 54 Tax L. Rev. at 153. 
144 Warren (2000), 54 Tax L. Rev. at 164.  
145 Warren (2000), 54 Tax L. Rev. at 159-61. 
146 Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1196 (discussing bilateral tax treaty nondiscrimination, as opposed 
to trade treaty nondiscrimination). 
147 One might be tempted to try to draw a distinction between discriminatory taxes that impose a higher burden 
on cross-border commerce than on domestic commerce and discriminatory taxes that discourage cross-border 
economic activity.  It is, however, clear from the ECJ’s regular usage of such words as “deter” and “interfere” that it 
does not view the fundamental freedoms and tax discrimination as concerned only with the economic impact on 
affected taxpayers, but also with the impact on their behavior.  See Roxan (2000), 63 Mod. L. Rev. at _. 
148 Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1233. 
149 Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1234 (emphasis added; footnote omitted) 
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do not directly advocate such an interpretation.  Of course, we recognize that one can change 
one’s interpretation over time, but Graetz and Warren do not acknowledge such a change or 
defend a different interpretation.  And although they might have come to a different 
interpretation since 2006, we believe they would be hard-pressed to deny that a competitive 
neutrality interpretation is at least a reasonable and intuitive interpretation of tax 
nondiscrimination. 
 
Although each of the commentators mentioned above writes about promoting competition 
through application of tax nondiscrimination, none explicitly links the interpretation of the tax 
nondiscrimination principle to the public finance concept of CON (or its labor analog).  
However, in the context of bilateral tax treaties, Professor Robert Green, who first used the term 
CON in a published article, explicitly coined and used that phrase to describe the goals of the 
nondiscrimination provisions of bilateral tax treaties.  Thus, in describing the fundamental 
freedoms and tax discrimination as informed by considerations of competiveness, we are not far 
removed from the views of other scholars.  Both tax policy experts and members of the ECJ have 
understood the prohibition of tax discrimination to promote competition between in-state and 
out-of-state interests—a value we argue can be understood formally as CON and its labor analog.  
In contrast, there is little support for the idea that the prohibition of tax discrimination promotes 
locational neutrality, that is, that it seeks to make neutral decisions about where taxpayers work 
or invest.150 
 
As we stated in the Article, it is our hope that if members of the ECJ agree that competitive 
neutrality is indeed the principle underlying their tax discrimination decisions, they will 
expressly endorse it and announce it as such.  That should lead to clearer, more predictable 
                                                 
150 We are aware of only one prominent commentator who has endorsed the view that tax discrimination is 
concerned with locational neutrality.  Daniel Shaviro argued that the dormant commerce clause of the U.S. 
Constitution should be interpreted to promote what he calls locational neutrality, which has the characteristic that it 
“minimizes the real social costs of production and ensures that low-cost producers will out-compete high-cost but 
otherwise equivalent producers.” Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 895, 900 (1992).  Thus, Professor Shaviro’s notion of locational neutrality is broad enough that it 
encompasses competitiveness concerns as well as the allocation of assets, which is the standard interpretation of 
locational neutrality. 
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decisions.  If the members of the ECJ instead regard some other norm as the principle underlying 
tax discrimination, we urge them to expressly identify that norm.151 
 
II. Applying the Competitive Neutrality Interpretation of Tax Discrimination 
In our original article, after arguing that the best interpretation of the tax nondiscrimination 
principle is that it seeks to promote competitiveness, we described how courts could apply that 
interpretation.  We began the latter argument by showing what the ECJ would have to do in order 
to rigorously enforce competitive neutrality in tax cases.  We showed that strict adherence to 
competitive neutrality requires what we called uniform source and uniform residence taxation. 
We also showed that because competitive neutrality is closely related to the concept of 
comparative advantage and so depends upon relative tax burdens across activities and actors, 
competitive neutrality will not obtain if states use different methods for taxing cross-border 
income.  Accordingly, in order for taxation not to influence whether a national form one state or 
another state owns an investment or takes a job, all states must agree on one of two acceptable 
methods of double tax relief.  We showed that competitive neutrality requires universal adoption 
of either an unlimited foreign tax credit or the ideal deduction method, one instantiation of which 
is exemption of foreign source income.  That is not a result that is immediately obvious, but it 
follows from our analysis. 
 
We acknowledged that the ECJ does not have the power or the authority to impose these 
stringent requirements (which would be even more stringent if the nondiscrimination principle 
were interpreted to advance CEN or CIN152) on the member states.153  That is because the ECJ 
cannot compel states to choose one or the other method of double tax relief.154  Accordingly, 
drawing inspiration from the experience of the U.S. Supreme Court with a similar tax issue, we 
suggested that the ECJ adopt what might be described as a variant of the U.S. “internal 
consistency test.”  Under this approach, the ECJ should uphold an alleged discriminatory tax as 
                                                 
151 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1116. 
152 If the nondiscrimination principle required CEN, all the member states would have to enact either residence-
only taxation or worldwide taxation with unlimited credits for source taxes. If the nondiscrimination principle 
required CIN, no member state could tax on a residence basis (unless residence taxes were perfectly harmonized), 
and each member state’s source taxes would have to be uniform.  See Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1072. 
153 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1074-5. 
154 Graetz and Warren argue that the ECJ has no basis to choose one method over the other.  Graetz & Warren 
(2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1147. We agree. Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1074. 
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long as the law was written in and enforced on a uniform source or residence basis.  A 
challenged source tax rule is uniform if it applies the same way to workers earning income in the 
jurisdiction, no matter their state of residence.  A challenged residence rule is uniform if it 
applies the same way to residents of the jurisdiction, no matter where they earn their income. 
 
Thus, we made both a theoretical argument that uniform taxation combined with universal 
adoption of either ideal deduction or worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits would 
under ideal conditions achieve competitive neutrality and a policy argument that in the absence 
of authority to impose a universal method of double tax relief (worldwide tax with unlimited 
credits or ideal deduction), the ECJ should enforce the nondiscrimination principle by striking 
down non-uniform tax laws. 
 
In our article, we claimed that under the usual economic assumptions (such as frictionless 
markets, no externalities, quick convergence to equilibrium, etc.) universal adoption of 
worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits or ideal deduction will achieve competitive 
neutrality.  Graetz and Warren are careful not to say that they disagree with that claim.155  They 
do, however, state that they could not follow our argument well enough to ascertain its 
validity,156 and they expressed doubts that we have adequately demonstrated what we set out to 
show.157  Accordingly, because our goal is to persuade and because different readers will prefer 
different levels of detail in order to find an argument persuasive, we have provided a more 
general derivation158 along the lines suggested by Graetz and Warren,159 and we have expanded 
the example of Françoise and Günther to cover more thoroughly parts of the argument we 
covered quickly in our article.  These are attached as appendixes 1 and 2. 
 
Although Graetz and Warren disagree with our interpretation of tax discrimination as 
concerned with promoting competitiveness, they are willing to assume such an interpretation for 
                                                 
155 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1146.  
156 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1145-46.  
157 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1145-46 . 
158 Of course, no proof or derivation is fully general. 
159 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale. L. J. at 1143-44 
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the purpose of evaluating our enforcement claims.160  However, even assuming such an 
interpretation of tax discrimination and assuming that uniform source and residence taxation are 
both required for competitive neutrality, Graetz and Warren raise several direct criticisms of our 
enforcement claims.  In this section, we have tried to organize those criticisms according to 
whether they are most directly a criticism of our theoretical argument (which Graetz and Warren 
label “full competitive neutrality”) or our policy argument (which Graetz and Warren label 
“partial competitive neutrality”).  With respect to our theoretical claim, Graetz and Warren argue 
that:  (1) the ideal deduction method cannot accommodate graduated tax rates;161 (2) the ideal 
deduction method, even if it works with graduated tax rates, will not work with tax base 
differences that reflect personal circumstances;162 and (3) the ideal deduction method is based on 
the implausible assumption that residence is fixed.163 
 
With respect to our policy recommendation, Graetz and Warren argue that (1) our approach 
to tax discrimination is unrealistic because it relies on the acceptance of one or more tax systems 
that do not resemble any current, real world tax systems;164 (2) tax discrimination cannot be 
discerned by looking at what just one state does, but requires consideration of the impact of 
taxation by both the source and residence states.165  Finally (3), Graetz and Warren offer three 
examples for us to consider, which they assert are typical of the kinds of cases any 
comprehensive theory of tax discrimination must be able to handle, but for which our proposals 
give no guidance.166 
 
                                                 
160 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale. L. J. at _.  Graetz and Warren, however, argue that the strictness of the 
conditions required for competitive neutrality is an argument against a competitive neutrality interpretation of tax 
discrimination.  In contrast, we view the treaties as promoting competitive neutrality and believe that no one at the 
time of their enactment had rigorously thought through what competitive neutrality required.  
161 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale. L. J. at 1149-51. 
162 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale. L. J. at 1149. 
163 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale. L. J. at 1148.  Presumably, the same criticism applies to residence-based 
taxation only or worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits.  
164 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale. L. J. at 1152. 
165 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale. L. J. at 1164. 
166 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale. L. J. at 1124-26. 
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A. Criticism of the Theoretical Claim: “Full” Competitive Neutrality 
1. Ideal Deduction and Graduated Tax Rates 
Graetz and Warren assert that the ideal deduction method does not work with progressive tax 
rates.167  Graetz and Warren support their claim through an example involving a taxpayer (call 
her Ida) who earns €10,000 at home (say Italy) where the source tax rate is 10% and €10,000 
abroad (say Austria) where the source tax rate is 5%.  Ida also faces a progressive Italian 
residence tax structure with a 15% tax rate on the first €10,000 and 30% thereafter.  As Graetz 
and Warren describe, under ideal deduction, Ida will pay €1,000 in Italian source taxes and €500 
in Austrian source taxes.  Under ideal deduction, Ida’s total residence taxable income is 
€18,500—€20,000 less the €1,500 in Italian and Austrian source taxes—and so her residence tax 
will be €4050.  Graetz and Warren then ask, “how much of the residence tax is attributable to the 
foreign income?  Is it half . . . or 95/185?  Without an answer to these questions, the taxpayer 
cannot make the (necessary) calculations.”168  Graetz and Warren then continue by assuming that 
the residence tax rate is zero and ask the same questions. 
 
In order to evaluate their assertion that our approach does not work with graduated tax rates, 
their example needs to be extended.  Our claim is that the ideal deduction method will not distort 
competitive neutrality even in the presence of a progressive residence rate structure.   Their 
numerical example does not provide for a decision that could be affected by a violation of 
competitive neutrality.  Without a decision to make, there is not enough structure to apply our 
method or test their assertion.  To introduce such a decision, assume that there is an option to add 
a third job either in Italy or Austria (we will call this third job Job 3I or Job 3A, depending on 
whether it is located in Italy or Austria).  In addition, assume there is another taxpayer, call him 
Andreas, who we will assume, continuing with Graetz and Warren’s example, resides in Austria, 
which does not impose a residence level tax.  Andreas has the same first two jobs as Ida (one 
each in Italy and Austria paying €10,000), and he is considering adding a third job, either Job 3I 
or Job 3A.  A second taxpayer is necessary because our claim is that the ideal deduction method 
will not distort the competition between or among taxpayers, so testing our claim requires more 
                                                 
167 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1149-51. 
168 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1150. 
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than one taxpayer.169  Assuming that both taxpayers would earn €10,000 in either incremental 
job (Job 3I or Job 3A),170 then, in the absence of taxation, neither one would have a comparative 
advantage over the other for either job.171 
 
This can be seen as follows.  If Ida took Job 3I, she would earn an additional €10,000 in 
Italy, whereas if she took Job 3A, she would earn an additional €10,000 in Austria. Thus, the 
ratio of Ida’s earnings on Job 3I to her earnings on Job 3A is 1.  Similarly, Andreas, because he 
also earns €10,000 in either position, also has a ratio of 1.  Because these ratios are the same, 
neither taxpayer has a comparative advantage in seeking either position. 
 
Now introduce taxation.  Consider Andreas who resides in Austria, which has no residence 
taxation.  Given a 10% source tax rate in Italy, he will earn, if he takes Job 3I, €10,000, pay 
€1,000 in tax, and be left with €9,000.  Alternatively, if he takes Job 3A, he will receive €10,000 
pay €500 in Austrian source tax, and be left with €9,500.  Thus, the ratio of his incremental after-
tax earnings from taking Job 3I to his incremental after-tax earnings from taking Job 3A is .947.  
Now consider Ida, who resides in Italy and is subject to progressive residence taxation.  If she 
takes the third job in Italy, she earns an additional €10,000, pays an additional €3,350 in tax, and 
is left with an €6,650.172  Alternatively, if she takes the third job in Austria, she still earns an 
additional €10,000; she pays an additional €3,700 in tax and is left with an additional €6,300.173  
Thus, the ratio of her incremental after-tax earnings from taking her third job in Italy to her 
incremental after-tax earnings from taking her third job in Austria is .947.  Because the ratios are 
the same for Andreas and Ida, the tax system has not compromised competitive neutrality.  Note 
                                                 
169 It is widely accepted that taxation will reduce the incentive to work. The debate is over the magnitude of the 
effect and the importance of the income effect.  The substitution effect of a higher income tax rate is to reduce work.  
In the language of international taxation, this would be a violation of the labor analogue of CIN. 
170 The assumption that both jobs pay €10,000, but that local source taxes are different, is somewhat 
problematic.  It suggests that there is some difference between the jobs that is not specified. 
171 The example assumes that a taxpayer does not change his or her state of residence by taking one or the other 
job. 
172 Ida’s incremental cash flow is calculated as follows.  Her €10,000 in earnings in Austria incurs Austrian  
source tax liability of €500.  She reports €9,500 income to Italy, her state of residence.  At her 30% marginal tax 
rate, she pays €2,850 more in residence tax.  Thus, her total tax obligation on the incremental €10,000 is €3,350, 
which leaves her with an incremental €6,650 after all taxes. 
173 Ida’s incremental cash flow is calculated as follows.  Her €10,000 in earnings in Italy incurs Italian source 
tax liability of €1,000.  She reports €9,000 income to Italy, her state of residence.  At her 30% marginal tax rate, she 
pays another €2,700 in Italian residence tax.  Thus, her total tax obligation is €3,300, which leaves her with an 
incremental €6,700 after all taxes. 
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that the progressive tax system has not compromised competitive neutrality, even though the tax 
rates differ across the taxpayers.  Competitive neutrality is not compromised, in spite of the 
different tax rates, because each taxpayer is subject to the same schedule regardless of which job 
he or she takes.174  Thus, not only does our approach accommodate progressive taxation, but it 
allows each state flexibility in determining its own schedule of progressive tax rates (i.e., it does 
not require rate harmonization).  This outcome is more respectful of member state tax 
sovereignty and national tax interests than are, for example, Graetz and Warren’s suggestions for 
various methods of tax harmonization.175 
 
2. Ideal Deduction and the Tax Base 
Graetz and Warren also claim that the ideal deduction method is not compatible with tax 
base differences that reflect differences in personal circumstances.176  They do not provide an 
argument or an example to support their assertion.  Accordingly, we constructed the following 
example to illustrate how such differences can be incorporated into ideal deduction without 
compromising competitive neutrality. 
 
Consider similar jobs in Bulgaria and Romania.  The jobs in both states can be filled by 
residents of either state.  Consider a job that pays €100 a week in Romania, which has a 20% 
source tax.  A worker who takes such a job will receive €80 after paying the Romanian source 
tax.  Assume that Bulgaria, which has a 50% source tax, has a provision in its tax law that allows 
a taxpayer with Bulgarian-source income a deduction against that income for certain personal 
circumstances.  The deduction is offered on a uniform source basis—that is, it is available to 
both Bulgarian and non-Bulgarian residents who work in Bulgaria.  Assume further that for a 
certain category of workers, those deductions total €20.  For now, assume that neither country 
assesses residence-based taxes.  Assuming a competitive market for workers between Bulgaria 
                                                 
174 The logic is the same for the more complex example to which Graetz and Warren make a brief reference.  
That example, an opera singer who is taxed in her country of residence at graduated rates and who has offers to 
perform in 20 countries, but who can accept only 10 of those offers.  See Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 
1151. 
175 See supra notes ___–___ and accompanying text (discussing Graetz and Warren’s argument that one 
coherent way forward for the ECJ in tax discrimination cases would be to choose among the following three options: 
(1) always apply only the source state’s tax law (destination rule) (2) always apply only the residence state’s tax law 
(origin rule) or (3) harmonize the tax laws of all the member states). 
176 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1149. 
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and Romania (and that prices in Bulgaria are determined by prices in Romania), the Bulgarian 
job will pay €140 a week in equilibrium.  A worker who takes a job in Bulgaria earns €140, takes 
a €20 deduction, and so reports taxable income of €120.  At a 50% Bulgarian source tax rate, the 
worker pays €60 in tax, and so is left with €80.  In this simple example, both Bulgarian and 
Romanian residents earn €80 after source taxation, regardless of where they work.    
Consequently, workers are indifferent as to whether to work in Bulgaria or Romania and there is 
no competitive distortion from the tax system, despite the differences in deductions available in 
Romania and Bulgaria. 177 
 
In contrast, if the Bulgarian tax system does not offer the deduction uniformly to both 
Bulgarians and Romanians working in Bulgaria, then the tax system will not be neutral with 
respect to the decision of which job to take.  If Romanians are denied the deduction, then 
assuming the Bulgarian job pays €140, Romanians will take home only €70 when they work in 
Bulgaria.178  They will then prefer to work in Romania (where their take home pay is €80) rather 
than Bulgaria (where their take home pay is €70).  Thus, the nonuniform tax system will have 
had the effect of distorting the matching of workers with jobs.179  Thus nonuniformly applied 
differences in tax bases will distort competition, and should, under our analysis, be struck down 
as discriminatory by the ECJ. 
 
This example can be extended from an exemption system to the ideal deduction method 
by introducing the possibility of residence taxation in addition to source taxation.  Assume 
Bulgaria has a uniform 10% residence tax that is assessed on the after-source-tax income of 
                                                 
177 That there is no competitive distortion from the Bulgarian and Romanian source taxes can be shown as 
follows:  The relative productivity of Romanians working in Romania (€140) relative to Bulgaria (€100) as 
compared with Bulgarians working in Romania (€140) relative to Bulgaria (€100) is equal to 1.  That is because 
((€140/€100)/(€140/€100)) is equal to 1.  Similarly, the relative after-tax wage of Romanians working in Romania 
(€80) relative to Bulgaria (€80) as compared with Bulgarians working in Romania (€80) relative to Bulgaria (€80) is 
also equal to 1.  Because the tax system has not altered the ratio of after-tax wages across states such that it differs 
from the ratio of before-tax productivity, there is no distortion.    
178 Bulgarians will earn €140 and pay €70 tax on that amount.  They will, thus, take home €70. 
179 That the non-uniform Bulgarian tax base distorts the competition between Bulgarians and Romanians for 
jobs can be shown as follows:  The relative after-tax wage of Romanians working in Romania (€80) relative to 
Bulgaria (€70) as compared with Bulgarians working in Romania (€80) relative to Bulgaria (€80) is equal to 1.14.   
In contrast, the relative productivity of Romanians working in Romania (€140) relative to Bulgaria (€100) as 
compared with Bulgarians working in Romania (€140) relative to Bulgaria (€100) is still equal to 1.  Thus, because 
the non-uniform Bulgarian tax base has not altered the ratio of after-tax wages across states (1.14) such that it differs 
from the ratio of before-tax productivity across states (1), there is a distortion.  The distortion will encourage the 
Romanians to work at home rather than Bulgaria.   
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Bulgarian residents regardless of where they earn their income.  Because Bulgarian residents 
earn €80 after paying Bulgarian or Romanian source tax, they will pay €8 in Bulgarian residence 
tax and be left with €72 after both source and residence taxes.  Assume Romania imposes a 30% 
residence tax on the after-source-tax income of Romanian residents regardless of where that 
income is earned.  Assume in addition that Romania provides a €30 deduction to offset some 
specified personal circumstance.  Assuming that the Romanian personal deduction is available 
on a uniform residence basis, which is to say that Romanian residents receive the deduction on 
the same terms, no matter whether the source of their income is Romania or Bulgaria, then 
Romanians will report €50 in residence income (the €80 after-source-tax amount less the €30 
deduction) to Romania, pay €15 tax, and be left with €65 after all taxes regardless of where they 
work.  Because Bulgarians and Romanians are still indifferent as to where they work, the tax 
system has not distorted the competition between Bulgarians and Romanians for jobs.180  Notice 
that our approach accommodates source- or residence-based tax base differences.  As long as 
states apply their tax bases uniformly—on a uniform source basis to all taxpayers working in the 
jurisdiction no matter their state of tax residence and on a uniform residence basis to all residents 
no matter the source of their income—tax bases can differ across states. 
 
This last point is worth emphasizing.  The tax systems just described, including the tax base 
adjustments, do not distort the competition among nationals from different states for jobs 
because the tax rates and bases are uniformly applied, despite the wide variety of entitlements 
available to taxpayers in the different scenarios presented here.  In our example, a Romanian 
resident who works at home receives one €30 deduction that is worth €15 after-all-taxes, 
whereas a Romanian resident who works in Bulgaria receives two deductions (one from 
Romania and one from Bulgaria) totaling €50 that are together worth €19 after-all-taxes.  
However, a Bulgarian who works in Romania does not receive any deductions, whereas a 
Bulgarian who works in Bulgaria receives one €20 deduction that is worth €4 after-all-taxes.  
Nonetheless, in spite of the differing numbers of deductions (0, 1, or 2), their total amounts (0, 
€15, €20, or €50), and their after-tax values (0, €4, €15, or €19), there is no violation of 
                                                 
180 More formally, the uniform Bulgarian and Romanian residence taxes (including the uniform deduction) have 
not compromised competitive neutrality.  There is no distortion because the relative after-tax wage of Romanians 
working in Romania (€65) relative to Bulgaria (€65) as compared with Bulgarians working in Romania (€72) 
relative to Bulgaria (€72) is equal to 1, which is also the ratio of their relative productivities.  
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competitive neutrality.  There is no violation because each state confers the deductions on either 
a uniform source or a uniform residence basis.  Moreover, attempts to equalize the number, total 
amount, or value of the deductions (without harmonizing rates and bases) will compromise 
competitive neutrality.  Thus, the deductions a taxpayer receives (i.e., the tax base) can differ 
depending upon where a worker resides and works without introducing competitive distortions, 
as long as the deductions (i.e., any tax base differences) apply on either a uniform source or 
uniform residence basis.  This is an important advantage of competitive neutrality—it can be 
implemented without the need to harmonize tax bases, which allows member state to retain 
significant autonomy to pursue policies through their tax codes. 
 
3. Ideal Deduction and the Assumption of Fixed Residence 
Graetz and Warren argue that our results are severely limited by our assumption of fixed 
residence.  According to Graetz and Warren, the fixed residence assumption implies that the 
ideal deduction method will not work to ensure competitive neutrality either when the worker 
has to move in order to change jobs or when the relevant taxpayer is an investor (or a 
corporation).181  In effect, they claim that the usual tax residence rule (a taxpayer becomes a 
resident of any state in which he resides for 6 or more months) will create a distortion that will 
interact with other distortions such that ideal deduction will not produce a competitively neutral 
equilibrium.  We believe Graetz and Warren overstate their case markedly. 
 
As we stated in our article, the residence rule can create a distortion only when the 
competition involves jobs that cross the residence threshold, i.e., non-commuting jobs lasting 
longer than six months.182 
 
As Graetz and Warren recognize, if one is competing for a series of short jobs, such as the 
example Graetz and Warren provide of an opera singer who will give 20 performances over the 
                                                 
181 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at _. 
182 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J.1071, n.170. For commuters who meet the six month threshold in 
more than one state (for example, because they cross national borders daily), residence-tie-breaker rules in bilateral 
tax treaties will generally select the state where the taxpayer has his permanent home as the residence state, whereas 
the work state will be the source state.  Such commuters thus constitute cross-border workers and fall comfortably 
within our analysis.  See OECD Model Tax Treaty, art. 4.  Thus, the class of workers that concern Graetz and 
Warren are only those who have to move to the work state for six months or more in order to be able to perform the 
job. 
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year, then because each performance is a short-term job, the decision to accept or not a particular 
engagement will not affect the singer’s tax residence.183  Thus, the same residence tax system 
will apply regardless of the job choices and so the residence rule does not distort job selection.  
Hence, it does not interfere with competitive neutrality. 
 
Next, consider positions that practically require the taxpayer take up residence in the state 
where the work is performed in order to accept the position.  Almost any long-term job requiring 
the service to be performed regularly on site and which is located far from a border would fall 
into this category.  There are many such examples, including doctors, executives, and clerks.  
Graetz and Warren claim that such jobs are outside the scope of our project.  They are correct in 
the sense that if one changes his or her residence in order to take such a job there is no issue of 
tax discrimination regardless of how the new state taxes because the taxpayer both resides and 
works in the same state, and the prohibition of tax discrimination applies only in cross-border 
cases, not in “purely internal” cases.  True enough, but note that, contrary to Graetz and 
Warren’s claim, there also would not be a competitiveness problem if the new state of residence 
imposes ideal deduction with uniform source and residence taxes as we suggest.  In such cases, 
there is taxation by only one state, although such a tax might be in two jurisdictional postures 
(source and residence).  Thus, ideal deduction and uniform taxation promotes competitiveness 
between nationals from different states (including those who change their state of residence 
subsequent to moving for a job). 
 
As we described in our article, the only circumstances in which the residence rule can create 
distortions is when employment crosses the residence threshold.184  If, for example, a job can last 
4 months (in which case residence remains as before the job) or 8 months (in which case 
residence shifts to the new location), then there can be a distortion that can affect the competition 
for work.  That is certainly possible, but it would not seem to be common.185 
                                                 
183 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1151.  Their objection with the opera example is to graduated tax 
rates.  We showed how to incorporate graduated tax rates in supra Part II.A.1 .   
184 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1071, n. 170. 
185 Moreover, even in such instances, there arguably still might be no violation of competitive neutrality.  That 
is because even in such cases, there is symmetry between nationals and non-nationals inasmuch as both have the 
same incentive to avoid working in a state long enough to be a resident if that state taxes its residents unfavorably.  
Thus, because the current residence rule is symmetric between residents and non-residents, both have the same 
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Graetz and Warren also assert that our analysis is inapplicable to capital whether owned by 
an individual or a corporation.  Again, they do not specify their argument.  What they seem to be 
asserting is that our claim that ideal deduction (and worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign 
tax credits) will achieve competitive neutrality only holds under the assumption that residence is 
fixed.  But investors (and corporations) can readily change their residence.  Therefore, Graetz & 
Warren seem to imply that ideal deduction (or worldwide taxation with unlimited credits) will 
not produce competitive neutrality for capital investments because investors (and corporations) 
are free to move away from their capital.  Although we agree that many investors can readily 
change their place of residence, we disagree with the conclusion that such freedom somehow 
implies that ideal deduction (or worldwide taxation) will not achieve competitive neutrality.  In 
contrast with work, which forces most people either to live near where they work or to change 
jobs, investors generally do not need to live near their investments.  For such investors, the 
residence choice can be largely divorced from the investment choice.  Thus, wherever such 
investors reside, they are likely to hold investments elsewhere.  Accordingly, to protect such 
investors from protectionist legislation, the uniformity requirements with ideal deduction are 
needed.186 
 
B. Criticism of the Policy Claim: “Partial” Competitive Neutrality 
1. Ideal Deduction is Unrealistic 
We now shift to Graetz and Warren’s criticisms of our policy recommendation that courts, in 
the absence of the ability to enforce all of the requirements of “full competitive neutrality,” 
should require uniform source and residence taxation.  Graetz and Warren argue that even if we 
are correct that ideal deduction will preserve competitive neutrality when there are differences in 
tax bases and progressivity, the tax systems we discuss and describe are so far removed from real 
world tax systems as to be impractical.187  We have several responses here. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
incentive to avoid residence in the high-tax state.  Hence, arguably even in this circumstance, there is no violation of 
competitive neutrality. 
186 See supra note _ - _ and accompanying text 
187 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1152. 
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First, as Graetz and Warren recognize, it is common to analyze international tax policy using 
ideal types such as exemption and worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits.188 
Graetz and Warren themselves employ this technique in their own work, and our analysis in 
terms of ideal deduction is similar.  It is useful to understand the ideal forms that must be 
employed to achieve specific tax neutrality benchmarks even when any real world system is 
likely to fall short of that goal.189 
 
Second, the ideal deduction method is in fact closer to actual practice than Graetz and 
Warren acknowledge.  Exemption is a form of ideal deduction.  Under an exemption system that 
also satisfies the requirements of ideal deduction, the first stage of taxation would consist of 
uniform source taxes at whatever rate each source country selects autonomously, and the second 
stage would be uniform residence taxation where every country sets the residence tax rate to 
zero.  Most of the member states already employ exemption tax systems (although none 
implements exemption perfectly, which they would all have to do to achieve full competitive 
neutrality). 
 
Moreover, there are real world examples of two-stage taxation in which the second stage tax 
rate is not set to zero.  For example, many aspects of the social welfare and support system that 
are administered through the tax laws have these qualities.  Such provisions are often granted on 
a uniform residence basis, despite the taxation of earned income taxed on a source basis.190  
However, the clearest example of the ideal deduction method is the classical corporate income 
tax.  With such a tax, the corporation is taxed on its income and the investor is taxed on the same 
income.  The investor is typically taxed on dividends, which are clearly and explicitly an after-
tax cash flow, and capital gains, which are implicitly so.  Thus the classical double tax system is 
one in which the source country taxes the profits to the corporation, and the residence country 
taxes the after-tax profits (i.e., the corporate profits after deduction of source state corporate 
taxes) to the shareholder.  This is similar to how the ideal deduction method works—the source 
                                                 
188 Graetz and Warren recognize this. Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1151. 
189 Proponents of eliminating deferral of taxation of foreign corporate income often defend that policy on the 
ground that such a change would move the tax system closer to CEN.  However, few, if any, of those proponents 
would endorse all the steps, including unlimited foreign tax credits, necessary to achieve CEN.   
190 In addition, in many, although not all instances, the benefits are a function directly or indirectly of after-tax 
income.  Where the residence state provides benefits on a uniform residence basis, this can be thought of as a second 
stage of taxation in which the tax rate is negative. 
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state taxes the worker’s earned income, and then the residence state taxes the same income after 
allowing a deduction for source taxes. 
 
Moreover, states often impose a withholding tax on dividends paid to foreign shareholders.  
Because such a tax is not imposed on dividends paid to domestic shareholders, the dividend 
withholding tax represents a differential (i.e., non-uniform) treatment of foreign and domestic 
shareholders.  The effect of that differential treatment is to discourage foreign shareholders 
relative to domestic shareholders from investing in domestic companies.  As Graetz and Warren 
recognize, bilateral treaties tend to reduce withholding tax rates.191  By doing so, they are moving 
the tax system’s treatment of investments in corporations closer to ideal deduction.192 
 
2. One-State or Multistate Approach 
In our article, we argued that one advantage of adopting the requirement of uniformity as the 
key enforcement guideline for tax discrimination is that it would make tax discrimination cases 
reasonably straightforward to resolve because, among other reasons, the courts would only have 
to look at the law of one state to determine whether that state discriminated.193  If a law is 
uniform either on a source or residence basis, the law is not discriminatory; otherwise it is 
discriminatory.  Graetz and Warren see our one-state approach, not as an advantage, but as a 
failing.  In their words, “[o]ur own view is that any serious attempt to identify the tax advantages 
or disadvantages for cross-border income should take account of the tax consequences in both 
countries.”194  Graetz and Warren provide no reasons, arguments or examples to support that 
assertion.  That makes it difficult to respond.  What they might have in mind is given by the 
following example. 
                                                 
191 Graetz & Warren (2006), 115 Yale L.J. at 1209. 
192 An interesting question raised by the tax treatment of corporations is how to integrate the corporate and 
individual income tax systems without compromising competitive neutrality and whether and how the ECJ’s extant 
jurisprudence on this topic furthers competitive neutrality.  That important question is beyond the scope of this sur-
reply, but it merits attention. 
193 The court would still have to consider whether any discrimination was justified before declaring a policy 
unlawful. The ECJ has held that a defendant member state could cure its discrimination by securing in a bilateral tax 
treaty with another state a promise from the other state to rectify the discrimination (for example, by providing a tax 
credit that would undo the discrimination).  However, if the second state does not actually cure the discrimination, 
despite its obligation in the bilateral tax treaty, the ECJ has said that the obligation to cure would revert to the 
defendant state.  See, e.g., Case C-170/05, Denkavit Internationaal BV, 2006 E.C.R. I-11949; Case C-379/05, 
Amurta, 2007 E.C.R. I-9569..  See also W. Hellerstein, et al., Constitutional Restraints on Corporate Tax 
Integration, 62 Tax L. Rev. 1, 30-32 (2008) at 30-32. 
194 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1164. 
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Assume Finland taxes (non-corporate) investments in Finland by domestic residents at 40% 
and that Finland also taxes inbound (non-corporate) investments at a higher rate, say 50%.195 
This scheme violates the uniformity rule because it applies different source tax rules to residents 
and nonresidents.  Therefore, we would say that the Finnish tax system discriminates against 
nonresidents. 
 
Assume, however, that Sweden, which taxes both Swedes and non-Swedes at 30% on their 
(non-corporate) investments in Sweden, also provides a 10% subsidy to Swedes who make (non-
corporate) investments in Finland.  The Swedish subsidy exactly offsets the incremental burden 
of the non-uniform Finnish tax on Swedes investing in Finland.  In such circumstances, the tax 
systems of Sweden and Finland taken together achieve CON.  Moreover, if our uniformity rule is 
adopted by the ECJ, and the result is that Finland reduces the tax rate on inbound investors from 
50% to 40%, the resulting tax system will not be competitively neutral as long as Sweden 
continues to subsidize its residents’ investments in Finland.  Swedes will have a tax-induced 
advantage when acquiring (non-corporate) assets in Finland.  In contrast, a more exhaustive 
approach that looked at both source and residence states would recognize that the Swedish 
subsidy offsets the higher Finnish tax and would lead to the correct result. 
 
We offer two observations in response.  First, the Swedish subsidy is a non-uniform 
residence subsidy, and as such, it will create competitive distortions when it interacts with the 
uniform (i.e., competitively neutral) source tax rules of member states other than Finland.  Thus, 
upholding Finland’s non-uniform source tax because Sweden has a non-uniform residence tax 
that just happens to perfectly offset the competitive distortion introduced by Finland against 
Swedes does little to advance competitive neutrality overall.  In any case where the residence 
state, unlike Sweden, does not enact a compensatory subsidy to overcome its residents’ adverse 
treatment in Finland, the non-uniform Finnish source tax will violate competitive neutrality.  
Thus, a two-state (or multistate) approach raises the possibility that the same Finnish residence 
                                                 
195 If Finland provided its resident taxpayers with a 10% subsidy on their foreign investments, then the Finnish 
tax system would be uniform on both a source and residence basis, so to make things simple, we further assume 
further that Finland does not tax residents on their income from foreign investments. 
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rule could be held to be nondiscriminatory when applied to Swedes, but discriminatory when 
applied to residents of other EU member states.196 
 
It, thus, follows that the complexity of the ECJ’s requisite analysis multiplies as the number 
of member states increases.  That can be seen by extending the example.  Consider a third 
country, Estonia, which taxes both Estonians and non-Estonians at 20% on non-corporate 
investments in Estonia and which does not generally tax Estonians on their income from foreign 
investments.  Such a tax scheme is competitively neutral because it is uniform (and therefore we 
would say it is nondiscriminatory).  But in order for the (non-uniform) Finnish tax system to 
maintain competitive neutrality when applied to inbound investment Estonians, Estonia must 
provide its residents with a 10% subsidy when they invest in Finland, but not when they invest in 
Sweden. 
 
Consider now a fourth country, Latvia, which similar to Finland taxes nonresidents at a 
higher rate than residents on their (non-corporate) investments in Latvia.  Assume Latvia taxes 
Latvians at 20%, but it taxes non-Latvians at 35%.  Assuming Latvia does not generally tax its 
residents on their foreign source (non-corporate) investment income, Latvia still must provide a 
10% subsidy for Latvians investing in Finland in order for the Finnish tax system not to 
compromise competitive neutrality.  In addition, Finland must provide its residents with a 15% 
subsidy when investing in Latvia to maintain competitive neutrality.  Moreover, Sweden and 
Estonia, which already must provide their residents who invest in Finland a 10% subsidy to 
prevent Finland from violating competitive neutrality, must also provide their residents with a 
15% subsidy when investing in Latvia to prevent Latvia from violating competitive neutrality. 
 
As the number of member states expands, the complexity increases.  With 28 member states, 
the analysis would be very complex and cumbersome.197  And for what purpose?  How likely is 
it that any single state’s discriminatory tax policy would be perfectly offset by the policies of all 
                                                 
196 Likewise, if the ECJ began to strike down cases of “reverse discrimination,” the Swedish nonuniform 
residence subsidy might be held to be nondiscriminatory when applied to investments in Finland, but discriminatory 
when applied to investments elsewhere in Europe.   
197 To determine whether one state’s policies discriminate against residents of the other member states, requires 
looking at how that state treats its residents and the residents of the other 27 member states.  If one is looking to 
draw conclusions about a specific tax policy in general, then the same exercise has to be done for each of the 28 
member states.  That leads to 784 [=28 x 28] possible nodes.  
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the 27 other member states?  Presumably, very unlikely.  (Talking about holy grails!)  And at 
what cost?  The data requirements would be extensive; the litigation costs would likely be very 
large; and the judicial system will provide less useful guidance.  And it is even possible that the 
TFEU’s prohibition on state aids would be interpreted to limit the states’ use of such 
compensatory subsidies.198 
 
The doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court is instructive in this area.  The Court has refused to 
analyze the impact of other states’ tax laws when considering whether a defendant state engaged 
in tax discrimination in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, even though other states’ 
rules may interact with the tax rules of the defendant state.  According to the Supreme Court, the 
constitutionality of the accused state’s tax law should not “depend on the shifting complexities of 
the tax codes of 49 other States.” 199  Because we agree with this line of thinking, we would 
argue that the ECJ has taken the wrong path on those occasions when it has taken a two-state 
approach.  Rather, each state’s tax law must stand or fall on its own merits. 
 
Our second observation is that in order to compensate its residents for the non-uniform 
source tax imposed by Finland (Finland taxes domestic investors at 40%, but foreigners at 50%), 
Sweden provides a 10% subsidy on its residents’ investment that is outbound to Finland.  This 
means that Sweden expends its public resources to maintain a level tax playing field for its 
residents who invest in Finland.  Sweden forgoes 10%, and Finland receives an extra 10%.  This 
creates a revenue shift that rewards Finland for its discrimination. 
 
3. Three Examples 
Graetz and Warren give three examples and argue that a competitive neutrality approach to 
nondiscrimination would not clarify how to resolve them.  Earlier we discussed the first example, 
                                                 
198 At the same time, one should keep in mind how easy it is to be confused about whether a tax or subsidy is 
needed to offset another state’s policies.  As we described both in the prior section and in our Article, it is readily 
intuitive, but wrong that tax benefits should be available to everyone “once, somewhere” and that a cross-border tax 
system that conveys different levels of benefits to similar people who reside and earn income in different states is 
not necessarily in violation of competitive neutrality.   As long as those policies are applied on a uniform source and 
residence basis, they will not violate competitive neutrality. 
199 ARMCO Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984). 
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which involved a charity that was subject to a restrictive regulation in another member state.  We 
will not revisit that example here, except to note that our goal was to provide guidance in 
discrimination cases, not necessarily in restriction cases. 
 
The second example offered by Graetz and Warren involves corporate tax integration.   They 
ask whether a country that grants tax credits to resident individuals for corporate taxes paid on 
local source income (e.g., imputation credits) should be required to extend those credits to cover 
corporate taxes paid to foreign governments on foreign source income.200  That is a very 
important question.  As mentioned above and in our article, we have tried to avoid discussing 
corporate tax examples in our original article and this sur-reply, even though our approach has 
applications in that area, because of the extensive background and detail that would be required 
to address those issues.  At the risk of not adequately preparing interested readers not familiar 
with the complexities of corporate taxation (both domestic and international), we will respond 
briefly to the challenge. 
 
We start by recognizing that it is possible to talk about competitive neutrality in the corporate 
tax context (i.e., CON) at two levels:  the level of the corporation making investments and the 
level of investors in the firm.  The combination of a uniform and flat source tax on corporations 
and a uniform (although not necessarily flat) residence tax on investors will achieve competitive 
neutrality at both levels.  Accordingly, granting such credits on a uniform source or residence 
basis will preserve competitive neutrality.  Thus, if the country grants the imputation credit on a 
residence basis, it would have to extend it to all residents, including those who have foreign-
source corporate dividends.  In contrast, if the country grants the imputation credit on a source 
basis (i.e., against all dividends issued by resident corporations), the credit would have to apply 
to all dividends sourced within the territory, whether the shares were owned by resident or 
foreign shareholders.201  However, granting the credit on a non-uniform source or a non-uniform 
residence basis (i.e., imputation credits only for resident shareholders of resident companies) 
would disrupt competitive neutrality on at least one level and possibly at both levels.202 
                                                 
200 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1165. 
201 If the imputation credit is granted on a source basis, then for the shares held by foreign investors the source 
state would provide a refund either to the corporation or to the foreign shareholders.   
202 These results are demonstrated through an example in Appendix III. 
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The third example offered by Graetz and Warren is that of a same sex couple who marries in 
one state where such marriages are recognized but who, in order to take jobs, subsequently 
moves (long enough to establish tax residency) to a second state that does not recognize such 
marriages.  Graetz and Warren ask whether the second state should be required to recognize their 
marriage.  According to Graetz and Warren, if the second state fails to recognize the marriage, 
the couple will be dissuaded from moving to the second state in order to take jobs for which 
they, by hypothesis, have a comparative advantage.203  The conclusion that they will be 
persuaded from moving, however, does not follow.  Assuming that the relevant jobs in the 
second state require residence there as a practical matter, then everyone competing for those jobs 
has to be a resident of that state (i.e., we’re in a purely internal situation).  In such circumstances, 
everyone who competes for those jobs will be subject to the local rules, including the rule failing 
to recognize same-sex marriages.204  Thus, the rule applies to everyone considering taking the 
job (i.e., it is uniform), and therefore will not violate competitive neutrality. 
 
If Graetz and Warren mean that differences in marriage law across different member states 
will affect residence decisions; they are correct.  But there is no evidence that the 
nondiscrimination principle of the TFEU aims to make residence decisions neutral, indeed, there 
is much evidence of the opposite.  The intent in the EU appears to be, at least in part, to set up 
regulatory competition among the member states, and although this may have originally 
primarily encompassed competition for economic regulation, member states also compete for 
residents though social regulation.  There is much evidence in cases that one of the overarching 
goals of the TFEU is to create regulatory competition, at least in those areas (including direct 
tax) not harmonized at the EU level.205 
 
                                                 
203 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1165. 
204 Of course, the same sex couple might be competing with others, some who are married and others who are 
not, for the same jobs.  As commentators have long recognized the taxation of married couples as a unit as opposed 
to taxing all individuals on their own terms distorts job choice within a single jurisdiction.  Not surprisingly, our 
approach cannot cure ownership distortions that would exist in a single jurisdiction or with a harmonized tax system.  
However, recognizing that the free movement rights and the nondiscrimination principle are concerned with 
competitive neutrality would help to frame the issue.   
205 See discussion in supra note 104 and Part I.B.4.  
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III. Conclusion 
In their 2006 article, Graetz and Warren argued that the ECJ’s tax discrimination 
jurisprudence accorded with neither CEN nor CIN.206  We agree with that conclusion.207  Graetz 
and Warren further argued (relying on the well-known proof of the impossibility of 
simultaneously achieving both CEN and CIN without harmonizing taxes) that because CEN 
would impose nondiscrimination obligations only on residence states, and CIN would impose 
obligations only on source states, the simultaneous imposition of nondiscrimination obligations 
on both source and residence states was incoherent and erected, in their terms, a “labyrinth of 
impossibility.”208 
 
It is with this latter conclusion that we disagreed.  In our view, imposition by the ECJ of 
nondiscrimination obligations at both source and residence does not necessarily show that the 
Court was trying to do the impossible by trying to enforce both CEN and CIN, a goal that is 
impossible to achieve in the absence of tax rate harmonization.  Instead, our argument is that 
imposition of nondiscrimination obligations at both source and residence is consistent with 
competitive neutrality—an efficiency norm that Graetz and Warren did not consider in 2006.  
One virtue of reconciling the imposition of nondiscrimination obligations at both source and 
residence with a coherent efficiency goal is that, as we say in the article, it accords with the 
intuition that “states may impermissibly discriminate in either capacity:  when taxing in a source 
capacity, they may discriminate between resident and nonresident workers; when taxing in a 
residence capacity, they may discriminate between residents’ foreign and domestic income.”209 
We also argued that a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination fits the ECJ 
jurisprudence better than does either CEN or CIN.  And we argued that a competitive neutrality 
interpretation of the tax nondiscrimination principle can be supported by the language of the 
treaty, history, and the policy goals of political and economic union (although we did not attempt 
the kind of through-going normative analysis that would enable us to conclude that competitive 
neutrality is the best possible interpretation of the tax nondiscrimination principle from an 
                                                 
206 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1212-23. 
207 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1051-1053. 
208 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1243. 
209 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1106. 
56 
 
efficiency perspective).210  We regard as a separate question whether one ought to interpret the 
nondiscrimination principle as promoting competitive neutrality if one were choosing an 
efficiency norm for the European Union from scratch and were not constrained by the existing 
EU treaties and the ECJ’s interpretations of those treaties.  Indeed, as Graetz and Warren point 
out, in our article we concede that many economists would regard locational distortions as more 
welfare-reducing than competitive distortions.211 
 
Our project, then, stands in contrast with that of Graetz and Warren’s.  They examined the 
substantive outcomes in tax cases and criticized the ECJ’s infringement on EU member states’ 
tax sovereignty.  Tax policy, in Graetz and Warren’s view, ought to be made by the member 
states, not the ECJ.  At times, therefore, Graetz and Warren seem to advocate that the ECJ should 
abandon its nondiscrimination jurisprudence.  For example, they state that our own analysis 
“confirm[s their] view that constitutional courts should not be making tax policy based on 
abstract and contradictory principles of nondiscrimination.”212  But while we acknowledge that 
nondiscrimination principles are notoriously slippery, it is not clear what alternative the ECJ has 
to deciding such cases.  The TFEU clearly provides that member states may not discriminate 
against EU nationals when they exercise their fundamental freedoms.  Likewise, the TFEU 
provides a clear procedure for national courts to refer to the ECJ questions of EU law for 
preliminary ruling.213  The ECJ cannot simply reject such ruling requests, and to do so would 
simply result in even more haphazard results, as there would be no supranational court that could 
reconcile the conflicting interpretations of the TFEU by national courts.  Thus, notwithstanding 
that nondiscrimination cases are difficult to handle—and that, as a policy matter Graetz and 
                                                 
210 See, e.g., Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1086  (“Support for a competitive neutrality interpretation 
of tax discrimination derives from the goals of the EU common market, the language and structure of the EU 
treaties. and the ECJ’s case Law. . . . [W]e do not primarily advocate competitive neutrality from first principles.”). 
211 As Graetz and Warren concede, the empirical evidence to make the choice between the various neutrality 
benchmarks does not exist.  Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1140-1.  Presumably this means that, in their 
view, no valid efficiency choice can be made among the options.  If so, this criticism would apply equally to their 
own menu of choices, namely, (1) apply the source state’s rules (CIN), (2) apply the residence state’s rules (CEN), 
or (3) harmonization (CEN plus CIN).  The ECJ cannot simply stop deciding tax discrimination cases; it has a 
mandate to aid in the enforcement of EU nationals’ rights and the interpretation of EU law.  Thus, it must either 
make a choice among efficiency principles, or it must interpret the prohibition on tax discrimination without any 
reference to economic efficiency. 
212 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1152. 
213 See TFEU, art. 267 (preliminary rulings). 
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Warren have a preference for tax policy issues to be decided by legislatures, not courts—the ECJ 
must resolve them. 
 
An alternative that might satisfy Graetz and Warren might be for the member states to strip 
the ECJ of its jurisdiction to hear tax cases.  Although this move was considered in the 
negotiations over the EU Constitution, the member states rejected it.214  The member states 
apparently regard the ECJ’s jurisprudence in this area to be worth both any confusion it presently 
generates and any infringement of their tax sovereignty.  This is not a difficult conclusion to 
understand, when we consider the importance of the fundamental freedoms to the operation of a 
single market and the kinds of national tax schemes that the ECJ has struck down.  Among other 
domestic business tax provisions, the ECJ has struck down (1) a law that taxed foreign banks at a 
higher rate than domestic banks,215 (2) a law that allowed trade tax deductions for rental 
payments made to domestic (but not foreign) companies,216 and (3) a law that allowed payment 
of interest on tax refunds to resident, but not nonresident, taxpayers.217  Similarly, the Court 
struck down a tax provision that allowed deduction of professional training expenses if the 
training took place domestically, but created a rebuttable presumption that professional training 
expenses for courses taking place abroad were nondeductible because they involved a significant 
tourism element.218  The Court also has invalidated individual tax provisions that allowed 
residents, but not nonresidents who earned all or almost all their income in the defendant state, to 
(1) deduct pension contributions,219 (2) enjoy the benefits of marital joint filing,220 and (3) deduct 
other personal and family expenses.221  Similarly, the Court has held that states may not establish 
significantly more onerous tax administrative procedures for nonresidents than residents, 222 nor 
                                                 
214 See Frans Vanistendael, The ECJ at the Crossroads: Balancing Tax Sovereignty Against the 
Imperatives of the Single Market, 46 Eur. Tax’n 413, 413 (2006). 
215 Case C-311/97, Royal Bank of Scotland plc v. Greece, 1997 E.C.R. I-2651. 
216 Case C-294/97, Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG v. Finanzamt Dortmund-Unna, 1999 E.C.R. I-7447. 
217 Case C-330/91, Queen v. Inland Revenue Comm’rs, ex parte Commerzbank AG, 1993 E.C.R. I-4017. 
218 Case C-55/98, Skatteministeriet v. Vestergaard, 1999 E.C.R. I-7641. 
219 Case C-80/94, Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Directe Balastingen, 1995 E.C.R. I-2493. 
220 Case C-87/99, Zurstrassen v. Administration des Contributions Directes, 2000 E.C.R. I-3337 (Luxembourg 
required spouses to live together in the same household to qualify for joint filing, but this requirement did not apply 
to Luxembourg-resident couples). 
221 Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225. 
222 See, e.g., Case C-175/88, Biehl v. Administration des Contributions de Luxembourg, 1990 E.C.R.I-1779 
(holding that Belgium discriminated against nonresidents workers by requiring them to secure refunds for overpaid 
taxes via a discretionary, case-by-case administrative procedure, whereas residents automatically received refunds of 
tax overpayments). 
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may states allow residents, but not nonresidents, to deduct fees for tax advice.223  Without an 
enforcement of the legal prohibition on tax discrimination, such protectionist provisions would 
remain in place indefinitely, hampering cross-border commerce.  Indeed, the absence of any 
enforcement would invite the member states to enact more protectionist tax policies.  
Additionally, because EU-wide tax legislation requires the unanimous agreement of the member 
states, it is extremely difficult for the member states to eliminate tax discrimination via 
legislation.224  Thus, the imperfect instrument of the tax nondiscrimination principle, and its 
enforcement by the ECJ, remain the most important method for removing tax barriers to cross-
border commerce in the European Union. 
 
The other alternative suggestion made by Graetz and Warren would constrain member states 
far more than would our proposal to make explicit the notion that the nondiscrimination principle 
in the TFEU requires competitive neutrality.  Graetz and Warren argue that, to be consistent, the 
ECJ must take the same approach in the direct tax area that it has taken in the area of regulation 
of goods.  Namely, the Court should choose among three options: (1) it could apply only the 
source country’s tax rules (destination state rule), or (2) it could apply only the residence state’s 
tax rules (origin state rule equivalent to the mutual recognition principle seen in Cassis), or (3) 
the EU legislature could harmonize the source and residence state rules.  Since the ECJ has no 
authority to accomplish (3), its choice presumably lies between (1) and (2).  But the TFEU 
provides no guidelines for the choice between (1) and (2), and making that choice arguably falls 
outside the institutional competence of the ECJ.  Moreover, forcing the ECJ to make such a 
dramatic choice strikes us as an odd recommendation coming from Graetz and Warren, who 
claim to be concerned that the ECJ has delved too far into national tax policy matters that are 
better left to the legislatures of the individual states.  In contrast, under a competitive neutrality 
interpretation of nondiscrimination, both the source and residence states can continue to apply 
their autonomously drafted national tax laws, provided that those laws apply uniformly to 
domestic and cross-border situations. 
 
                                                 
223 See, e.g.,C-346/04, Robert Hans Conijn v. Finanzamt Hamburg-Nord, 2006 E.C.R. I (Germany could not 
deny nonresidents a deduction for tax advising expenses related to preparing their German taxes when it allowed 
resident Germans to deduct those expenses). 
224 TFEU, art. 115 (unanimity). 
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According to Professors Graetz and Warren, we are “stuck in a labyrinth of impossibility” 
searching for the “holy grail of tax discrimination.”225  However, we are not working in the realm 
of mythology where the gods have all the answers, or theoretical physics, where the right answer 
causes all of the pieces to fall in line perfectly.  Instead, we are dealing with flesh and blood 
judges and legislators—the men and women who drafted the foundational documents, who wrote 
the tax laws, and who must decide the cases and issue their opinions.  To require 100 percent 
explanatory power for any theory or interpretation is unrealistic and to impose such a 
requirement is to ensure that the only possibility is to continue to muddle through with little hope 
for more coherence or better results. 
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225 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1127. 
Appendix I – 1 
 
Appendix I 
Derivation 
 
In this Appendix, we seek to provide a simple example that explains our basic results for 
when taxation will and will not distort competitive neutrality.  This appendix, thus, responds to 
the request by Graetz and Warren to provide more support for our claims that various tax 
systems either will or will not promote competitive neutrality.  Because our claims about 
competitive neutrality apply to both labor and capital, in this Appendix we use capital.  With 
only slight variation, the example could be turned into a labor example. 
 
Consider an economy with only two countries, Portugal and Italy, denoted P and I.  Assume 
Italy is much larger than Portugal and that Italy sets market prices in the economy.  Investors can 
readily invest all the capital they want in a riskless benchmark asset without affecting its rate of 
return.  The benchmark asset, located in Italy, pays a before-tax annual rate of return of b.  A 
party from Italy and a party from Portugal are both considering investing in a riskless alternative 
asset, C, which is assumed to be located in Portugal.  There is only one unit of asset C available.  
Both parties have more than enough cash available to purchase the entire amount of the 
alternative asset.  Any funds not invested in the alternative asset will be invested in the 
benchmark asset.  The alternative asset, which is fully divisible, will pay C once a year in 
perpetuity.  If all of the alternative asset is owned by the Portuguese investor he will receive CP 
and if it is all owned by the Italian investor, she will receive CI.  Denote the value of the 
alternative asset by V.  Thus, the value of the alternative asset to the Portuguese investor, VP, is 
given by the following expression: 
	 .      (1) 
Similarly, the value of the alternative asset to the Italian investor, VI, is given by the 
following expression: 
.     (2) 
Obviously, if the parties place different values on the asset, it will be fully acquired by the 
party who values it the most.  Thus, the Portuguese investor will acquire the asset if and only if 
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he values the asset more than the Italian investor.  Gathering terms, the above statement implies 
that: 
	 	 	 	 	 	1.     (3) 
It is clear from equation (3) that the alternative asset will be acquired by the party who can 
produce more value with the asset.  Thus, in the absence of taxation competitive neutrality will 
obtain.1 
 
The next step is to introduce taxes.  Denote the total tax rate by T with a subscript to denote 
residence and a superscript to denote source.  Thus, TI
I denotes the total tax rate of an Italian 
resident on an investment in Italy (the benchmark asset).  Similarly, TI
P denotes the total tax rate 
of a Italian resident on an investment in Portugal (the alternative asset).  Likewise, TP
I denotes 
the total tax rate of a Portuguese resident on an investment in Italy.  Finally, TP
P denotes the total 
tax rate of a Portuguese resident on an investment in Portugal.   It follows that the Portuguese 
resident will earn an after-tax annual return of (1- TP
I)b if he invests in the benchmark asset, 
whereas the Italian resident will earn (1- TI
I)b if she invests in the benchmark asset.   Similarly, 
the after-tax return the Portuguese resident will earn if he invests in the alternative asset is (1- 
TP
P)CP, whereas the Italian investor will earn an after-tax return of (1- TI
P)CI if she invests in that 
same asset.  Because both investors are assumed to invest any available funds not invested in the 
alternative asset in the benchmark asset, the value of the alternative asset to the Portuguese 
investor, VP, is given by the following expression: 
	       (4) 
Similarly, the value of the alternative asset to the Italian investor, VI, is given by the 
following expression:  
	 .      (5) 
 
                                                 
1 This is what Graetz and Warren refer to as proposition 2.  See Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1143. 
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As before, the alternative asset will be acquired by the party that places the higher value on 
that asset.  That, in turn, implies the following: 2 
	 	 	 	 	 	,    (6a)  
which in turn implies:  
	 	 	 	 	1.	     (6b) 
 
It follows from equations (6a) and (6b) that what we call “retention ratios,” that is, the ratio 
of the share of an investor’s before-tax earnings he would retain after taxes if he invested in the 
alternative asset (1-TP) relative to the share of before tax earnings he would receive if he invested 
in the benchmark asset (1-TI), can affect who owns what investments.   Specifically, in the case 
where the alternative asset produces the same amount in both investors’ hands, equations (6a) 
and (6b) can be rewritten as:3  
	 	 	 	 	 	     (7a) 
or 
	 	 	 	 	1.	     (7b) 
If the fraction in equation (7b) is close to 1, then small changes in tax rates will have a 
dramatic impact on the ownership of assets.  A small change in taxes that causes the fraction in 
equation (7b) to shift from less than 1 to more than 1 will shift ownership of the alternative asset 
from the Italian investor to the Portuguese investor.  Equation (6a) demonstrates how such 
changes could have negative welfare consequences by causing society to lose the benefit of the 
more productive owner.  It is such distortions that are the logic behind CON as a normative 
welfare benchmark. 
                                                 
2 This establishes what Graetz and Warren refer to as proposition 1.  See Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. 
at 1143. 
3 This establishes what Graetz and Warren refer to as proposition 3.  See Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. 
at 1143. 
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Take a look at equations (3) and (6b).  The difference between equations (3) and (6b) is that 
equation (6b) also contains the fraction that is made up of the 4 retention rates.  Note further that 
in order to ensure that taxes will not affect ownership, the fraction made up from the various 
retention rates must equal 1.  If that fraction is not identically 1, then it is possible for taxation to 
affect the ownership of assets. 
 
The above tax rates, denoted by T, are total tax rates.  They represent the total tax rate paid 
on income by an investor from Italy or Portugal investing in either the alternative or benchmark 
asset.  Those rates are going to be a function of the rates in the two countries and a function of 
the tax system.  Thus, in order to examine how tax various tax policies will affect ownership, 
some additional notation is needed.  Denote the tax rate assessed by a single country by t.  If the 
tax is assessed by the country of residence that country is denoted by a subscript.  Thus, a 
residence tax assessed by Portugal is denoted by tP whereas a residence tax denoted by Italy is 
written tI.  A uniform residence tax is one where the same tax is assessed on domestic residents 
with domestic income as on domestic residents with foreign income.  When necessary, a second 
subscript is used to denote the source of the income.  Thus, the residence tax rate assessed by 
Italy on the domestic income of a Italian resident is written tI,I whereas the residence tax rate 
assessed by Italy on the foreign income of a Italian resident is written tI,P.  Hence, with uniform 
residence taxation, tI = tI,I = tI,P.  If the tax is assessed by the source country, then that country is 
denoted by a superscript.  Hence, the source tax assessed by Portugal is tP and the source tax 
assessed by Italy is tI.  By analogy to residence taxation, a second superscript is used where 
needed to designate the residence of the investor.  Thus, the source tax imposed by Portugal on 
income earned in Portugal by Portuguese residents is given by tP,P whereas the source tax 
imposed by Portugal on income earned in Portugal by Italian residents is given by tP,I.   
 
The total tax rates, T, can be expressed as functions of the source and residence tax rates, t.  
For example, if both Italy and Portugal embrace territorial taxation, then TP
P = tP,P and TI
P = tP,I.   
If Portugal has uniform source taxation, tP = tP,P = tP,I, then TP
P = TI
P = tP.   Similarly, if Italy has 
uniform source taxation, then TP
I = TI
I = tI. 
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Using the above notation, it is possible to express various tax policies.  For example, 
territorial taxation (with uniform source tax rates in each jurisdiction) implies in Portugal that 
TP
P = TI
P = tP and in Italy that TP
I = TI
I = tI.   Substituting the territorial tax rates in Portugal and 
Italy into equation (7b), that equation becomes:  
	 	 	 	 	1.	     (8) 
It is, thus, clear from equation (8) that the fraction on the right side of that equation after “as” 
is identically 1.  It, thus, follows that uniform source taxation does not compromise CON.   
 
Similarly, residence taxation (with uniform rates regardless of where one earns income) or 
worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits implies for Portuguese residents that TP
P = 
TP
I = tP and for Italian residents that TI
P = TI
I = tI.  Substituting the territorial tax rates in Portugal 
and Italy into equation (7b), that equation becomes:  
	 	 	 	 	1.	     (9) 
 
It is, thus, clear from equation (9) that the fraction on the right side of that equation after “as” 
is identically 1.  It, thus, follows that uniform residence taxation or worldwide taxation with 
unlimited foreign tax credits does not compromise CON.  
 
Finally, the total tax rates with ideal deduction can also be written as a function of the source 
and residence tax rates.  Assuming uniform source and residence taxation,4 then the total rates 
are as follows: 
	 1 1      (10a) 
	 1 1      (10b) 
	 1 1      (10c) 
	 1 1      (10d) 
                                                 
4 Uniform residence taxation implies that tI = tI,I = tI,P and that tP = tP,I = tP,P, but it does not require that tI = tP.  
Similarly, uniform source taxation implies that tI = tI,I = tI,P and that tP = tP,I = tP,P, but it does not require that tI = tP.  
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Substituting the total tax rates in equations (10a) – (10d) into equation (7b), that equation 
becomes:  
	 	 	 	 	1.	     (11) 
In equation (8), the two fractions on the right side of that equation after “as” multiply one 
another.  The first fraction is from equation (9), which is identically 1, and the second fraction is 
from equation (8), which is also identically 1.  It, thus, follows that the fraction on the right side 
of equation (11) is identically 1.  From that result it follows that ideal deduction does not 
compromise CON.5 
 
Equation (11) was constructed assuming that both Portugal and Italy employ uniform source 
and residence taxation.  Dropping that assumption, equation (11) can be rewritten as:  
	 	 	
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
	 	1.     (12) 
 
Although equation (12) is somewhat messy, it can be used along with equation (11) in order 
to understand how nonuniform taxation will compromise CON.   Focus on the top half of the left 
fraction, which describes how Portugal taxes its residents.  If Portugal taxes its residents 
uniformly that fraction, (1-tP,P)/(1-tP,I) is identically 1.  If it does not, then that fraction is not 
identically 1.  Such nonuniform taxation will compromise CON unless one of the other tax 
systems is nonuniform and that nonuniformity exactly offsets the nonuniformity in Portugal’s 
residence tax system.  The argument is the same for the bottom half of the fraction on the left, 
which describes Italy’s residence tax system.    
 
Moving from residence to source taxation, the right fraction describes the states’ source tax 
systems.  Recall that with uniform source taxation, the fraction on the top, (1-tP)/(1-tI), equaled 
the fraction on the bottom, which was identical to it, and so the right fraction was identically 1.  
If, however, one state, deviates from uniform source taxation, then the numerator of the right 
                                                 
5 Apparently, the claim that various tax systems do not violate CON is not part of what Graetz and Warren 
describe as the major propositions in our argument.  See Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1143-44.  
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fraction will not equal the denominator of that fraction.  Unless, therefore, there is another 
nonuniformity in the tax system that exactly offsets the first nonuniformity, CON will be lost. 6 
                                                 
6 This establishes in more detail than above what Graetz and Warren refer to as proposition 3.  See Graetz & 
Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1143.  This also establishes what Graetz and Warren describe as the conclusion.  
See Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1144. 
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Appendix II 
Françoise and Günther Revisited 
 
In our original article, we provided an arithmetic example designed to illustrate that both 
worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits and ideal deduction preserve competitive 
neutrality.1  In addition, we used that example to illustrate how nonuniform taxation will distort 
competitive neutrality.2  In their reply, Graetz and Warren observed that although we explicitly 
state that our results assume certain market conditions, our example does not clearly incorporate 
those conditions.3  Specifically, they note that our assumption that German producers are looking 
to produce a fixed output, not hire a fixed number of workers, is not directly incorporated into 
our example. 4  Accordingly, this appendix reworks the example of Günther and Françoise from 
our original article to explicitly incorporate that assumption.  In addition, we have taken this 
opportunity to revise the example slightly by changing some of the tax rates in the last example.  
We make that change for two reasons.  First, we make the change to allow for the possibility that 
tax rates will differ across all four quadrants.  Second, we make the change to show that even 
when tax rates are the same for competitors in a single market, it is still possible for taxation to 
distort competition. 
 
Consider two countries France and Germany.  Residents of both countries compete for jobs 
in both countries.  Initially, consider one resident from each country.  Françoise resides in France 
and Günther resides in Germany, and they both compete for a job in each jurisdiction. 5 Assume 
further that Françoise and Günther are equally productive when they work in France, but that 
Françoise is substantially more productive than Günther when working in Germany. Putting 
some numbers to these assumptions, let us say that Françoise and Günther each would produce 
€100 of output in France, that Günther would produce €100 in Germany, but that Françoise 
would produce €150 in Germany. Table 1 illustrates this.  
 
                                                 
1 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1060-68. 
2 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1068-72. 
3 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1144-46. 
4 Graetz & Warren (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1144-46. 
5 The jobs are assumed not to require residence changes.  Thus, Françoise will continue to reside in France 
regardless of the job she takes, and Günther will continue to reside in Germany regardless of the job he takes. 
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TABLE 1. COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY IN A NO-TAX WORLD 
 JOB IN FRANCE 
 
JOB IN GERMANY 
 
 Françoise Günther Françoise Günther 
Gross Income and Take-
Home Pay 
€100 €100 €150 €100 
 
Under these circumstances, and assuming that there is only one job in each state, productive 
efficiency requires Françoise to work in Germany and Günther to work in France. Françoise 
should work in France because the ratio (1½) of her productivity in Germany (€150) to her 
productivity in France (€100) exceeds the ratio (1) of Günther’s productivity in Germany (€100) 
to his productivity in France (€100). Conversely, Günther should work in France because the 
ratio (1) of his productivity in France (€100) to his productivity in Germany (€100) exceeds the 
ratio (2/3) of Françoise’s productivity in France (€100) as compared to her productivity in 
Germany (€150).  
 
That the market will efficiently match workers to jobs can be seen by assuming that 
Françoise and Günther compete for jobs by offering to take less than the full value that they 
produce.  When considering how much to bid for a job in Germany, both Françoise and Günther 
will consider their alternative job opportunities in France.  Since Günther earns €100 if he takes a 
job in France, which is the full value of his output there, he will not be willing to accept less than 
€100 in Germany, which is the full value of his output in Germany. In contrast, because 
Françoise is more productive in Germany than in France, she can lower the wage she demands in 
Germany (relative to her productivity) and still come out ahead compared to working in France, 
where the maximum she can earn is €100 (the full value of her output in France).  Specifically, 
Françoise will be willing to work for as little as €100 in Germany, even though she produces 
€150 there. 
 
In order to describe the nature of the equilibrium more clearly, assume that there are many 
Françoises and many Günthers and that employers are not restricted to hiring a fixed number of 
employees, but rather are trying to produce a given output at least cost.  Those assumptions 
imply that employers will select employees with the greatest relative difference between their 
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wage and their output.  To make this assumption concrete, assume that there are 100 identical 
Françoises and 100 identical Günthers each with productivity levels as given in Table 1.  In 
addition, assume that the demand for workers in France at a wage equal to their productivity 
level (€100) is unlimited.  In contrast, the demand in Germany for workers is limited.  Producers 
are willing to pay workers for €9000 of output.  Once that level of production is met, the demand 
for workers disappears.  The above assumptions imply that workers will earn their marginal 
product if they work in France, but they have to compete for work in Germany. 
 
Under these assumptions, each Françoise is willing to accept as little as 2/3 of her total 
output in Germany as payment for her services for working there.  That is to say, each Françoise 
is willing to accept as little as €100 to work in Germany because that is what she can earn in 
France.  That leaves German employers with a €50 surplus from hiring each Francoise.  If 
German employers hire only Françoises (no Günthers are hired in Germany), then 60 Françoises 
will be hired in Germany and their German employers will receive a total surplus of €3000.  
Accordingly, 40 Françoises will work in France, where they will earn €100, just as their German 
counterparts. 
 
As with each Françoise, each Günther will require €100 to work in Germany because that is 
what he can earn in France.6  However, because each Günther produces exactly €100 of output 
working in Germany, there is no surplus to the employer from hiring a Günther.  As a result, in 
the absence of taxation, equilibrium in the market for employees has all Günthers working in 
France earning €100, 40 Françoises working in France earning €100, and 60 Françoises working 
in Germany earning €100.  French employers earn no economic rents; they break even; German 
employers earn an economic rent of €50 for each Francoise they hire. 
 
The above equilibrium is a baseline without taxation.  We will use that baseline to show that 
when all states have the same international tax system, uniform taxes will not distort the 
matching of workers and jobs, whereas nonuniform taxes will.   We start by introducing 
worldwide residence taxes with unlimited credits for foreign taxes.  Assume that both France and 
                                                 
6 Thus, if all German employers hired Günthers, they could hire 90 Günthers.  That would leave 10 Günthers to 
work in France. 
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Germany implement worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits. Assume further that 
France taxes at 20% both its residents on their worldwide income and nonresidents (Germans) on 
their income earned in France whereas Germany taxes at 50% both its residents and nonresidents 
(French) on their German income.  The following chart compares how much each worker would 
take home after taxes if each earned his or her productivity-determined wage in each state: 
 
TABLE 2. COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY UNDER WORLDWIDE TAXATION 
  JOB IN FRANCE 
Uniform 20% 
worldwide taxation  
JOB IN GERMANY 
Uniform 50% 
worldwide taxation 
  Françoise Günther Françoise Günther 
a Gross Income 100 100 150 100 
b Source Tax (20) (20) (75) (50) 
c Net Residence Tax/Refund7 0 (30) 45 0 
e Take Home Pay 80 50 120 50 
 Total Tax Rate 20% 50% 20% 50% 
 
As residents of different states that have different tax rates, Françoise and Günther take home 
different amounts after payment of all taxes.  However, because the ratio of their after-tax wages 
relative to each other is unchanged from the world without taxes, taxation has not distorted the 
competition between Françoise and Günther for jobs.  Even after taxes, Françoise still earns 50% 
more when she works in Germany (€120) than when she works in France (€80), whereas 
Günther still earns the same amount (€50) no matter where he works. Although Françoise is 
taxed at a total tax rate of 20% whereas Günther is taxed at a total tax rate of 50%, the difference 
in tax liability does not translate into a change in the ratio of Françoise’s earnings in Germany 
relative to her earnings in France; nor does it translate into a change in the ratio of Günther’s 
earnings in Germany relative to his earnings in France. (Hence, taxation does not result in a 
change in the ratio of these two ratios.)  Thus, in order to have a job in Germany rather than in 
France, Françoise still would be willing to accept a (before-tax) salary equal to only two-thirds of 
what she produces in Germany. In contrast, Günther still would require payment for all he 
produces in Germany (or France).  Thus, implementation of worldwide taxation with unlimited 
foreign tax credits maintains competitive neutrality even in the presence of national tax rate 
                                                 
7 Taxes paid and cash outflows are negative numbers and are in parentheses; refunds and cash inflows are positive 
numbers and are not in parentheses. All of our examples assume that the residence state provides unlimited credits 
for source taxes. 
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diversity.  Accordingly, the equilibrium is still characterized by all 100 Günthers working in 
France earning €100, 40 Françoises working in France earning €100, and 60 Françoises working 
in Germany earning €100.  French employers also earn no economic rents; they break even; 
German employers earn an economic rent of €50 for each Francoise they hire.  
 
The second way to achieve competitive neutrality is for all states to enact what we call “ideal 
deduction” or the “ideal deduction method” of double tax relief, one instantiation of which is 
exemption. Under this method, taxes on cross-border income would consist of two stages. The 
first stage consists of uniform source taxes. That is, each state applies its source tax regime on 
the same basis to both nonresidents and residents who work in its territory. In the second stage, 
states tax the worldwide income of their residents, but first stage taxes (i.e., source taxes, 
including domestic source taxes) are deductible from income taxable at residence. Thus, under 
the ideal deduction method, states tax their own residents on two jurisdictional predicates: source 
and residence.  Under ideal deduction, states need not adopt the same tax rates as each other; that 
is, they need not harmonize their tax rates. However, each state must apply its own taxes 
uniformly. 
 
In our original article, we assumed each state assessed its source taxes at the same rate at its 
residence taxes.8  That assumption was not necessary for our results.  It also had the effect of 
equating total tax rates of French residents working in Germany and German residents working 
in France.9  Because that assumption is not necessary for our results, we now introduce different 
source and residence rates in each jurisdiction.   Accordingly, assume that France imposes a 30% 
source tax and a 20% residence tax.  Also assume that Germany imposes a 40% source tax and a 
50% residence tax on equivalent terms. Recall that under ideal deduction, each country applies 
its source tax uniformly to all workers, foreign and domestic, that earn income within their 
territory. 
 
Because jurisdictions now impose source taxes at different rates, those source taxes will 
affect the relative before-tax wages across the two countries.  Because German source income is 
                                                 
8 Mason & Knoll (2012), 121 Yale L.J. at 1065-67 (assuming that France imposes source and residence taxes at 
20% and Germany imposes source and residence taxes at 50%). 
9 The total tax rate in both circumstances were 60% [=20% + 50% - (20% x 50%)]. 
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taxed at 40%, whereas French-source income is taxed at only 30%, if jobs paid the same in 
Germany and France, both German and French residents would take home less if they worked in 
Germany than if they worked in France.  Accordingly, in equilibrium, jobs in Germany will pay 
more than equivalent jobs in France so that, regardless of their residence, workers will earn the 
same amount after payment of source taxes.  For example, in equilibrium, if a French job pays 
€100, then the equivalent job in Germany will pay €116.67,10 and the after-source-tax wage in 
each jurisdiction will be the same, namely €70. 
 
For this example, we maintain our assumption that Françoise and Günther are equally 
productive when they work in France, and we assume that they would both earn €100 (before 
tax) for work there. However, since in equilibrium wages are 16.67% higher in Germany than in 
France in order to compensate for higher German source taxes, both Françoise and Günther will 
earn more in Germany than in France.11  Since we continue to assume for this example that 
Françoise is 50% more productive than Günther when they both work in Germany, Günther will 
earn €116.67 if he works in Germany and Françoise will earn €175 if she works in Germany. 
The following chart shows that competitive neutrality is maintained if both states implement 
ideal deduction, which requires residence states to allow deductions for source state taxes 
(including their own source taxes),:12 
 
                                                 
10 Given the salary in France (€100), the salary in Germany is calculated as follows: €116.67 = €100 x (1-30%) / 
(1-40%). 
11 The higher German taxes will drive jobs to France. Only those positions in which workers are productive 
enough to cover the additional German source taxes will remain in Germany.  
12 The simplest version of ideal deduction is an exemption system. If the example in the text were changed so that 
France and Germany employed exemption, the tax rate in the second stage would be zero, which effectively 
eliminates the second stage. The taxpayers’ take home pay would be as follows: 
TABLE A. COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY UNDER EXEMPTION 
  JOB IN FRANCE 
Uniform 30% source 
tax, no residence tax  
JOB IN GERMANY 
Uniform 40% source 
tax, no residence tax 
  Françoise Günther Françoise Günther 
a. Gross Income 100 100 175 116.67 
b. Source Tax (30) (30) (70) (46.67) 
c. Residence Tax N/A N/A N/A N/A 
      
e. Take Home Pay 70 70 105 70 
 
When all the states employ exemption, no worker has a tax-induced advantage or disadvantage compared to any 
other for work in any particular jurisdiction. Thus, exemption maintains competitive neutrality. 
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TABLE 3. COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY UNDER IDEAL DEDUCTION 
  JOB IN FRANCE 
Uniform 30% source 
and 20% residence 
taxes 
JOB IN GERMANY 
Uniform 40% source 
and 50% residence taxes 
  Françoise Günther Françoise Günther 
a. Gross Income 100 100 175 116.67 
b. Source Tax (30) (30) (70) (46.67) 
c. Residence Income 70 70 105 70 
d. Residence Tax13 (14) (35) (21) (35) 
e. Take Home Pay 56 35 84 35 
 Total Tax Rate 44% 65% 52% 70% 
 
As in the example with worldwide taxation, Françoise and Günther earn different after-all-tax 
wages and pay taxes at different total rates. Even so, taxation will not affect the matching of 
workers with jobs.  Assuming that there is still unlimited demand for workers in France and that 
the demand for workers in Germany is still for a fixed output, say now €7000 to reflect the 
higher relative cost of production in Germany, all of the Günthers will continue to work in 
France, and Françoises (now 40) will fulfill the demand for workers in Germany.  As in the prior 
examples, no Günther is willing to accept less than the full value of what he produces in order to 
take a job in Germany, whereas each Françoise is still willing to take a one-third discount to 
work in Germany. Thus, as with worldwide taxation, implementation of the ideal deduction 
method maintains competitive neutrality even in the presence of national tax rate diversity. 
 
It is worth drawing attention to the total tax rates in Table 3.  Françoise’s total tax rate in 
France is 44%, whereas Gunther’s is 65%.  In Germany, Francoise’s total tax rate is 52%, 
whereas Gunther’s is 75%.  In spite of these different and widely ranging tax rates, taxation has 
not affected comparative advantage and so it has not altered competitive neutrality.  Expressed in 
terms of retention rates, the tax system has not affected the matching of workers and jobs 
                                                 
13 Under ideal deduction, workers are subject to tax on their worldwide income at their residence state’s rate, but 
source taxes (including domestic source taxes) are deductible from taxable income. 
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because it has not changed relative retention rates.14  Françoise’s retention rate in Germany 
(48%) is 6/7ths of her retention rate in France (56%).  Similarly, Gunther’s retention rate in 
Germany (30%) is 6/7ths of his retention rate in France (35%).  Thus, taxation has not affected 
the ratio of Françoise’s after-tax earnings in France relative to her after-tax earnings in Germany 
as compared to Günther’s after-tax earnings in France relative to his after-tax earnings in 
Germany.  
 
Although uniform taxation will achieve competitive neutrality when all states adopt the same 
method for taxing cross-border income (i.e., all states enact worldwide taxation or all states enact 
ideal deduction), universal adoption of the same method without uniform taxation will not 
achieve competitive neutrality.  For example, assume that both France and Germany still 
implement ideal deduction and that France assesses uniform source and residence taxes.  
Assume, however, Germany assesses non-uniform source taxes – perhaps to encourage German 
employers to hire German workers.  Specifically, Germany continues to tax the German income 
of French residents at 40% whereas it taxes the German income of German residents at only 5%. 
 
i. Table 4. Nonuniform Source Taxation Violates Competitive 
Neutrality Under the Ideal Deduction Method 
  JOB IN FRANCE 
Uniform 30% source 
and 20%  residence 
taxes 
JOB IN GERMANY 
Uniform 50% residence 
tax, nonuniform (5%, 
40%) source tax 
  Françoise Günther Françoise Günther 
a. Gross Income 100 100 175 116.67 
b. Source Tax (30) (30) (70) (5.83) 
c. Residence Income 70 70 105 110.83 
d. Residence Tax (14) (35) (21) (55.42) 
e. Take Home Pay 56 35 84 55.42 
 Total Tax Rate 44% 65% 52% 53% 
 
As Table 4 illustrates, although Françoise earns more after all taxes than does Günther regardless 
of where they work, Günther now has an advantage in the competition to secure a job in 
Germany. As in the prior examples, Françoise is willing to accept as little as 67% (i.e., €56/€84) 
of her productivity-determined wage in Germany to secure a job in Germany rather than a job in 
                                                 
14 Retention rates and ratios are described in Appendix I, supra. 
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France at which she would be less productive. However, because Günther faces a much lower 
source tax when he works in Germany than when he works in France, Günther is willing to 
accept as little as 63% (i.e., €35/€55.42) of his productivity-determined wage in Germany in 
order to secure the job in Germany rather than the job in France that would subject him to high 
German source taxation. Because employers will hire the worker with the largest relative 
difference between productivity and wage, employers in Germany now will prefer to hire 
Günthers, who demand in wages only 63% of what they produce (€73.68) than to hire 
Françoises, who demand 67% of what they produce (€116.67).  Accordingly, if employers in 
Germany are still looking to produce €7000 of output, they will hire 60 Günthers.  They will pay 
these Günthers €4420.80 in total, which will leave them a profit of €2579.20.  That is €246 more 
than they would earn if they hired 40 Françoises at €116.67 (for a total cost of €4666.80) to 
produce the same output.  The remaining 40 Günthers will be employed in France where they 
will be joined by all 100 Francoises.   
 
It is easy to show that the resulting allocation of workers to jobs is inefficient.  If German 
employers hired Françoises instead of Günthers, they would need to hire only 40 Françoises to 
produce what the 60 Günthers produce.  That would free 60 Günthers to work in France.  
However, it would take only 40 of those Günthers working in France to produce what the 40 
Françoises produced when they were working in France.  The output of the additional 20 
Günthers working in France is therefore surplus and hence proof of the inefficient allocation 
brought about by nonuniform taxation. 
 
Moreover, it should be pointed out that Günther has a tax-induced competitive advantage 
over Françoise to land a job in Germany in spite of paying tax at a slightly higher total tax rate 
(53%)  than Françoise (52%) when working in Germany.  That result can be expressed in terms 
of retention rates and retention ratios.  Günther’s retention rate if he works in France is 35% and 
his retention rate if he works in Germany is 47%.15  Accordingly, his retention ratio for working 
in Germany relative to working France is 115.8%,16 and his retention ratio for working in France 
                                                 
15 A retention rate is one minus a taxpayer’s total tax rate.  Accordingly, Günther’s retention rate if he works in 
France is 35% because his total tax rate if he works in France is 65%.  Similarly, Günther’s retention rate if he 
works in Germany is 47% because his total tax rate if he works in Germany is 53%.   
16 This is calculated as 115.8% = 47% ÷ 35%. 
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relative to Germany is 86.3%.17  Similarly, Françoise’s retention rate in France is 56% and her 
retention rate in Germany is 48%.18  Accordingly, her retention ratio in Germany relative to 
France is 85.7% and her retention ratio in France relative to Germany is 116.7%.19    Thus, 
Günther has a tax-induced competitive advantage over Françoise in Germany as compared to 
France because his retention ratio (115.8%) is higher than her retention ratio (85.7%).  
Conversely, Françoise has a tax-induced comparative advantage over Günther to land a job in 
France as compared to Germany because Françoise’s retention ratio in France as compared to 
Germany (116.7%) is higher than Günther’s retention ratio (86.4%).  As the above example 
illustrates, Germany’s nonuniform source tax has reversed Françoise’s  comparative advantage 
over Günther in Germany.  Françoise derived her original comparative advantage over Günther 
in Germany from her greater productivity in Germany,  However, Germany’s lower tax rate on 
the German income of Germans as compared to the German income of non-Germans more than 
offset the productivity advantage of non-Germans. 
 
Alternatively, Germany might try to dissuade Germans from working abroad by taxing 
Germans at a higher rate on their foreign income than their domestic income.  Assume that 
Germany assesses uniform source taxation at 40%, but that Germany assesses non-uniform 
residence taxation.  Specifically, assume Germany taxes the foreign income of German residents 
at 50%, but that it imposes a residence tax on the German income of German residents of only 
20%.  The following chart shows the income, taxes, and take-home pay of Françoises and 
Günthers.  
 
                                                 
17 This is calculated as 86.3% = 35 ÷ 47%. 
18 Françoise’s retention rate if she works in France is 56% because her total tax rate if she works in France is 44%.  
Similarly, Françoise’s retention rate if she works in Germany is 48% because her total tax rate if she works in 
Germany is 52%.   
19 Françoise’s retention ratio in Germany relative to France is calculated as 85.7% = 48 ÷ 56%, and her retention 
ratio in France relative to Germany is calculated as 116.7% = 56% ÷ 48%. 
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ii. Table 5. Nonuniform Residence Taxation Violates Competitive 
Neutrality Under the Ideal Deduction Method 
  JOB IN FRANCE 
 Uniform 30% source 
and 20%  residence 
taxes  
JOB IN GERMANY 
Uniform 40% source 
tax, nonuniform (20%, 
50%) residence tax 
  Françoise Günther Françoise Günther 
a. Gross Income 100 100 175 116.67 
b. Source Tax (30) (30) (70) (46.67) 
c. Residence Income 70 70 105 70   
d. Residence Tax (14) (35) (21) (14) 
e. Take Home Pay 56 35 84 56 
 Total Tax Rate 44% 65% 52% 52% 
 
As in the prior example, nonuniform taxation (now nonuniform residence taxation) has 
provided the Günthers with a tax-induced comparative advantage in the competition to secure a 
job in Germany. As in the prior examples, Françoise is willing to accept as little as 67% (i.e., 
€56/€84) of her productivity-determined wage in Germany to secure a job in Germany rather 
than a job in France at which she would be less productive. However, because Günther faces a 
much lower residence tax when he works in Germany than when he works in France, Günther is 
willing to accept as little as 63% (i.e., €35/€56) of his productivity-determined wage in Germany 
in order to secure the job in Germany rather than the job in France that would subject him to high 
German residence taxation.  The equilibrium is the same as above – and is just as inefficient.  As 
this example makes clear, it is not enough to maintain uniform source taxation (and agreement 
on a method of taxing international income) to achieve competitive neutrality.  In addition, 
residence taxes must also be uniform. 
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Appendix III 
Imputation Credits 
 
In this Appendix, we demonstrate that corporate integration accomplished by granting 
shareholders imputation credits for taxes paid by their corporations will not compromise 
competitive neutrality if those imputation credits are granted on a uniform source or uniform 
residence basis.  However, before demonstrating that imputation credits are consistent with 
competitive neutrality, we first demonstrate that the classical corporate income tax is consistent 
with competitive neutrality.  Both demonstrations are made through a simple example.  
 
Consider Danish investors in a Danish company that earns only Danish-source income.  
Assume Danish corporations earn an annual before-tax return of 10% and that Danish 
corporations distribute all their after-tax earnings.  Assume further that Denmark imposes a flat 
40% corporate tax and a flat 50% personal tax and that Denmark has a classical corporate tax 
system.   Thus, a €1000 investment by a Dane in a Danish company will return €100 after one 
year.  That €100 income will attract €40 corporate tax.  The Danish investor will report €60 of 
personal income and will incur a personal tax liability of €30.  That liability will leave the 
Danish investor with €30.  Thus, Danish residents earn 3% annually after-tax on investments in 
Danish companies, and Danish companies can raise capital from Danish investors at 10%, which 
is also the hurdle rate for new investment by Danish companies. 
 
Now consider, Poland, which we assume also has a classical corporate income tax system.  
Assume Poland imposes a flat 25% corporate tax and a flat 30% personal tax.  Corporate 
investments in Poland earn 8% annually before tax, and Polish corporations also fully distribute 
their after-tax earnings.1  Thus, a €1000 investment in Poland will generate €80, which will 
attract €20 tax, leaving the investor with €60.  A Pole who invests €1000 in a Polish company 
will earn €60 a year after paying Polish corporate tax and pay €18 in individual tax.  That will 
leave the Polish investor with €42.  Similarly, a Polish investor who invests €1000 in a Danish 
company will receive a dividend of €60, pay €18 in individual tax, and be left with €42.  Thus, a 
                                                 
1 The lower before-tax return in Poland is a result of a lower source tax rate in Poland than in Denmark.  The 
lower source tax rate in Poland will attract capital to Poland thereby violating locational neutrality. 
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Polish investor would be indifferent between the two investments.  Similarly, a Danish investor 
would be indifferent between investing in the shares of Polish and Danish companies.  Either 
way, the Dane receives €60 each year after corporate tax, pays €30 of individual tax, and so is 
left with €30.  Thus, the classic corporate income tax (with uniform source and residence taxes) 
will not compromise competitive neutrality.2 
 
Assume now that Denmark grants imputation credits that credit resident investors fully for 
the taxes paid by Danish corporations on Danish-source income.  Assuming that the before-tax 
return on Danish investments does not change, so that a €1000 investment in such a company 
will still return €100 after one year, the investment will still incur €40 corporate tax.  However, 
in contrast with the classical corporate income tax, the Danish investor will report €100 income 
(comprised of €60 cash dividend and €40 corporate tax paid on that dividend) and will incur a 
tentative tax liability of €50.  That liability will be reduced by the €40 credit, resulting in an 
additional liability of €10, and leaving the Danish investor with €50 after the payment of all 
taxes.  Thus, Danish residents earn 5% after-tax on investments in Danish companies and Danish 
companies can still raise capital from Danish investors at 10%. 
 
Assume further that the credit is implemented by both Denmark and Poland and that the 
credit is granted on a uniform residence basis inasmuch as each state fully credits both foreign 
and domestic corporate taxes that are indirectly paid by its residents.  That is to say, Denmark 
grants Danish residents imputation credits for corporate taxes paid by both Danish and Polish 
corporations, and Poland grants Polish residents imputation credits for corporate taxes paid by 
both Danish and Polish corporations. .  In such circumstances, shareholders’ tax liabilities 
depend only upon their residence tax rates, not at all on the corporate tax rates.  Accordingly, 
because differences in the corporation state’s tax rates will not affect investors’ total tax 
                                                 
2 The above result can be expressed using retention rates and ratios, as described in Appendix I.  Danish 
investors pay a total tax rate of 70% on corporate investments in Denmark and of 62.5% on corporate investments in 
Poland.  Thus, Danish investors’ retention rates are 30% for investments in Danish corporations and 37.5% for 
investments in Polish corporations.  Thus, Danish investors have a retention ratio of 80% for investments in Danish 
as compared to Polish corporations. Polish investors pay a total tax rate of 58% on corporate investments in 
Denmark and of 47.5% on corporate investments in Poland.  Thus, Polish investors’ retention rates are 42% for 
investments in Danish corporations and 52.5% for investments in Polish corporations.  Thus, Polish investors have a 
retention ratio of 80% for investments in Danish as compared to Polish corporations.  Therefore, because the 
retention ratios are the same (80%), the classical corporate income tax with uniform taxes does not distort 
ownership. 
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liabilities, taxes will not distort the location of capital.  Thus, in the simple example employed 
here, pre-tax returns will be equal across states.  Assume, then, that a €1000 investment in a 
Danish or Polish corporation produces an annual pre-tax return of €100.   After paying all taxes, 
Danish investors will earn €50 on investments in both Danish and Polish corporations whereas 
Polish investors will earn €70 on such investments.  Although Danes are taxed more heavily than 
are Poles, taxes will not distort ownership.3 
 
Assume now that Denmark and Poland grant imputation credits on a uniform source basis.  
As applied to Denmark, for example, Denmark will refund to Polish shareholders of Danish 
corporations the taxes paid by Danish corporations on behalf of Polish shareholders.  Under such 
circumstances, source taxes will not impact investors.  Effectively, domestic and foreign 
investors will pay tax on their equity investments in both domestic and foreign corporations at 
the investors’ individual residence tax rate.4   Thus, as in the prior example, after paying taxes, 
Danish investors will earn €50 on investments in both Danish and Polish corporations whereas 
Polish investors will earn €70 on such investments.  And as in the prior example, although Danes 
are taxed more heavily than are Poles, taxes will not distort location or ownership. 
 
In contrast, if Denmark and Poland were to adopt non-uniform versions of shareholder 
imputation, then ownership would be distorted.  Assume that Denmark and Poland both choose 
to grant imputation credits to residents only and only for equity investments in domestic 
corporations.  Thus, Denmark will grant imputation credits only to Danish investors in Danish 
corporations and Poland will grant imputation credits only to Polish investors in Polish 
companies.  Accordingly, Denmark will not grant imputation credits to Danish investors in 
Polish companies or to Polish investors in Danish companies, nor will Poland grant imputation 
credits to Polish investors in Danish companies or to Danish investors in Polish companies.  To 
                                                 
3 The above result can also be expressed using retention rates and ratios.  The retention rate for Danes is 50% 
for equity investments in both Denmark and Poland and the retention rate for Poles is 70% for equity investments in 
both Denmark and Poland.  Accordingly, the retention ratios for Danes and Poles are both 1 and so ownership is not 
distorted by taxes. 
4 The difference between this and the prior example is that in the prior example (credit extended to 
shareholdings in foreign companies) the corporations’ state receives and retains the corporate tax revenue when 
foreign investors hold shares in domestic corporations.  In contrast, in the current example (credit extended to 
shareholdings by foreign investors in domestic companies) the corporations’ state does not retain corporate tax 
revenue when foreign investors hold shares in domestic corporations.  
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keep the calculations simple, assume that rates of return are unchanged with all corporations 
earning 10 percent before taxes.  Danish investors would pay a total tax of 50% on investments 
in Danish corporations and a total tax of 62.5% on investments in Polish corporations.  In 
contrast, Polish investors would pay 40% total tax on investments in Polish corporations and 
58% total tax on investments in Danish corporations.  Because Danish and Polish investors are 
both taxed more heavily on investments in foreign corporations, the tax system distorts 
ownership by encouraging both groups of investors to invest in domestic rather than foreign 
corporations. 5 
 
The discussion above looked at only a few limited examples with imputation credits.  We 
intend to examine corporate integration in more detail in future work.  
 
                                                 
5 The above result can also be expressed using retention rates and ratios.  Danish investors pay a total tax rate of 
50% on corporate investments in Denmark and of 62.5% on corporate investments in Poland.  Thus, Danish 
investors’ retention rates are 50% for investments in Danish corporations and 37.5% for investments in Polish 
corporations.  Thus, Danish investors have a retention ratio of 133% for investments in Danish as compared to 
Polish corporations. Polish investors pay a total tax rate of 58% on corporate investments in Denmark and of 40% 
on corporate investments in Poland.  Thus, Polish investors’ retention rates are 42% for investments in Danish 
corporations and 60% for investments in Polish corporations.  Thus, Polish investors have a retention ratio of 70% 
for investments in Danish as compared to Polish corporations.  Accordingly, because Danes (133%) have a higher 
retention ratio than Poles (70%) for equity investments in Danish as compared to Polish corporations, the tax system 
distorts ownership by encouraging Danes to invest in Danish corporations and discouraging Poles from doing so.  
The retention ratios are the inverse for investments in Poland as compared with Denmark.  Thus, Danish investors 
have a retention ratio of 75% for equity investments in Poland as compared to Denmark, whereas Polish investors 
have a retention ratio of 143% for such investments.   Accordingly, because Poles (143%) have a higher retention 
ratio than Danes (75%) for equity investments in Polish as compared to Danish corporations, the tax system distorts 
ownership by encouraging Poles to invest in Polish corporations and discouraging Danes from doing so.   It, 
therefore, follows that non-uniform imputation credits will distort ownership compromising competitive neutrality. 
